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MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE: A CASE STUDY OF THE MEXICAN MILITARY, 1917-1940

By
ROBERT CARRIEDO

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A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

The three great enemies of the Mexican people are clericalism, capitalism, and militarism. We [the military] can get rid of clericalism and capitalism, but in the end, who will get rid of us?

General Alvaro Obregón March, 1915

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Abstract of Thesis Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree of Master of Arts

MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE: A CASE STUDY OF THE MEXICAN MILITARY, 1917-1940

Ву

Robert Carriedo

December 1992

Chairman: Jeffrey D. Needell

Major Department: Latin American Studies

This thesis will explore the relationship between military professionalism and military political influence. While many scholars believe that increased military professionalism will "depoliticize" the armed forces, others argue that professionalization encourages the military to assume an active and even dominant role in politics. Thus, within the context of these two opposing theories, this thesis will analyze the process of professionalization that the Mexican military experienced during the years 1917-1940, and the role it played in limiting the political influence of the Mexican military.

Most scholars who study Latin America have concluded that military professionalism has led to a highly politicized military that exercises a strong, if not dominating, influence in the government. Thus, Mexico is an

extremely interesting case to examine, not only because it is one of the few nations in Latin America that has enjoyed a prolonged period of stable civil-military relations, but also because professionalization of the military occurred during the same era as the loss of political influence. Given the traditionally strong political role of Latin American militaries, it is only natural to question why the Mexican military has not conformed to this pattern.

It is my contention that there were several characteristics unique to the professionalization of the Mexican military that were largely responsible for the decline of its political influence. Key among these unique characteristics was the incorporation of a revolutionary ideology into the professionalization process that successfully equated loyalty to the principles of the Mexican Revolution with loyalty to the national government. In addition, Mexico's leaders sought to preserve this revolutionary ideology by maintaining strict national control over the professionalization process. Also unique was the strategy to gradually professionalize the Mexican military by creating a corps of young professional officers who would eventually inherit control of the military from those generals who were veterans of the Mexican Revolution. Finally, it was crucial that the professionalization of the military did not occur by itself, but concurrent with the development of a strong political party.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This thesis explores the relationship between military professionalism and military political influence. While many scholars believe that increased military professionalism will "depoliticize" the armed forces, others argue that professionalization encourages the military to assume an active and even dominant role in politics. Thus, within the context of these two opposing theories, this thesis will analyze the process of professionalization that the Mexican military experienced during the postrevolutionary era, and the role it played in limiting the political influence of the Mexican armed forces.

Problem Statement

As stated above, there is a controversy concerning the relationship between military professionalism and the level of political influence exercised by the armed forces.

Essentially, different scholars, using nations from all

¹Samuel P. Huntington is traditionally cited as the most notable proponent of the view that greater professionalism will decrease the political influence of the military. This theory is also supported by Edwin Lieuwen. On the other side of the controversy, scholars such as Bengt Abrahamsson, Samuel Finer, and Frederick M. Nunn have argued that increased professionalism will heighten the military's political influence. The theories proposed by these and many other scholars will be discussed fully in Chapter 2.

regions as examples, have argued that military professionalism causes the armed forces to assume a limited political role, or conversely, induces the military to exercise a great amount of political influence.

Particularly among Latin Americanists, most scholars have increasingly drawn the latter conclusion. In view of this trend, Mexico is an extremely interesting case to examine, not only because it is one of the few nations in Latin America that has enjoyed a prolonged period of stable civil-military relations, but also because professionalization of the military occurred during the same era as the loss of political influence.

Admittedly, one could explore this period in the history of the Mexican military by using the full range of theory and analysis that currently comprises the field of civilmilitary relations. This field contains a rich body of literature that includes such broad topics as the origins of coup-initiated governments, and the factors that lead to military disengagement from politics. This thesis, however, will not attempt to utilize the full range of such theory, or provide a comprehensive explanation of how the Mexican military came to exercise a limited political role under the authority of civilian control. Rather, this study will restrict itself to the much narrower aspect of the relationship between professionalization of the military and their influence in government politics.

Obviously, the trend toward increasing professionalism within the Mexican military prior to and concurrent with the gradual decrease in political influence does not prove that professionalism was a factor in the Mexican military's reduced political role. What is needed, and what this thesis will examine, is the unique manner in which the Mexican military was professionalized, the timing with which it was implemented in relation to other important events during the postrevolutionary period, and the causal relationships to the decrease in the military's role in government politics. Thus, the central question is stated as follows: what role did the professionalization of the Mexican military during the years 1917 to 1940 play in limiting the military's political influence?

Significance

Over the past thirty years, scholarly works have become more sophisticated and explanatory in their analysis of civil-military relations in Latin America. This trend has been a welcome change from the previous era, in which the works on Latin American militaries tended to be largely descriptive rather than analytical and explanatory. This previous era witnessed a concentration on the military caudillo and the more dramatic manifestations of military political action, such as coups, at the expense of more

subtle but penetrating institutional factors.² Perhaps this trend is a recognition of the fact that an understanding of the politics of Latin America would be incomplete without an understanding of its military institutions and the close relationship that has always existed between civilian and military factions.

A detailed analysis of the Mexican military during the era in which it was transformed both professionally and politically will be a welcome addition to this movement to provide a more sophisticated analysis of civil-military relations, since Mexico is one of the few Latin American countries where this transformation occurred so completely. In addition, the Mexican military is often cited as one of the least studied in Latin America, and this study will thus fill a significant gap in this area of research.³

Furthermore, this study will provide increased understanding to those who are interested in determining how the military can come to play less of a dominant role in government politics, particularly in the region of Latin America. During recent years the topic of demilitarization in Latin America has often been a stated concern of policy makers in First-World nations, particularly in the United

²Lyle McAlister, "Recent Research and Writing on the Role of the Military in Latin America," <u>Latin American</u> Research Review, Vol. 2 (Fall, 1966), p. 5.

³Roderic A. Camp, "Mexican Military Leadership in Statistical Perspective Since the 1930s," <u>Statistical Abstract of Latin America</u>, Vol. 20 (1980), p. 596.

States. In this case, a decreased political role for the military has often been considered a necessary condition to creating or sustaining a lasting democratic government, which theoretically, will be more efficient in providing for the needs of its citizens, and more conducive to working with and supporting the United States in addressing domestic and international issues. While this study does not intend to provide a "recipe" for reducing or eliminating the political influence of the military, it will be of interest to those who wish to gain insight into an historical example of how this very phenomenon was accomplished.

Objectives/Expected Results

To test the relationship between military professionalism and the level of political influence exercised by the armed forces, it will be necessary to measure and assess the change in the level of the military's political influence, and then examine and document the process of professionalization experienced by the Mexican military, being careful to consider other factors besides professionalism that may have had an impact on the Mexican military. Accomplishing these tasks will result in a clearer understanding of the unique nature of Mexico's military professionalism, and the true impact this had on the military's decline in political influence. Because civil-military relations in Mexico during the postrevolutionary period present an unusual case that has

largely gone unstudied, this analysis will advance the current state of knowledge and result in a more sophisticated comprehension of the relationship between military professionalism and the level of military political influence.

Methodology

Theoretical Concepts

As a North American researching the decline of militarism in Mexico, a country that is often much more foreign to the United States than its close proximity would suggest, this study is greatly influenced by the theories and observations made by Edward W. Said in his book, Orientalism. 4 Although Said is discussing how the study of Eastern cultures by Western society has developed into an institution that has been used to dominate, restructure, and exercise authority over the Orient, his book could have just as easily been titled "Latin Americanism," for the basic argument of the book can also be applied to the relationship between Latin America and the United States. One of Said's goals in writing Orientalism is to sensitize scholars so that they are aware of this power-relationship, and so that they will approach their own work and the work of others more critically. As Said clearly states:

⁴Edward W. Said, <u>Orientalism</u> (New York: Vintage Books, 1978).

there can be no disclaiming the main circumstances of his actuality: that he comes up against the Orient as a Furopean or American first, as an individual second. And to be a European or an American in such a situation is by no means an inert fact. It meant and means being aware, however dimly, that one belongs to a power with definite interests in the Orient, and more important, that one belongs to a part of the earth with a definite history of involvement in the Orient almost since the time of Homer.⁵

Substituting the term "Latin America" for "Orient" does not change the validity of Said's observation. Indeed, one need only look back at the earlier discussion concerning the importance of this study, which recognized the expressed interest of United States policy makers in reducing the political influence of the military in Latin America, to see that it is quite difficult to deny Said's conclusion. With these ideas in mind then, this study will benefit from Said's warning and approach the general study of Latin American military institutions with more care and more awareness of existing personal biases.

As Latin American historian Steve J. Stern has pointed out, one of the most basic errors committed by scholars who study Latin America is the over-dependence on theoretical concepts derived from the experience of Western Europe. 6 For example, the understanding that Latin Americans have of the manner in which the military and the government interact

⁵Ibid., p. 11.

⁶Steve J. Stern, "Feudalism, Capitalism, and the World-System in the Perspective of Latin America and the Caribbean," <u>American Historical Review</u>, Vol. 93, No. 4 (1988), p. 867.

is completely different from the European and American understanding of the process. In the European and American view, the military is often regarded as an alien and sinister force that exists outside the political process, never interacting with civilian groups but acting independently only through conspiracies organized by ambitious and greedy generals. Yet, it is rarely the case where the Latin American military can be seen to enter the political system as an outside force, as if it were an autonomous institution that could enter and withdraw itself from the political process at will. Realistically, the Latin American military has to be seen as a force that is highly interrelated with civilian political forces. Even a study such as this, in which the stated aim is to explain the decline of the Mexican military's political influence, does not assume that the military has ever stopped being an influential force within Mexican politics, or that the western concept of military professionalism will necessarily find an exact replication in the Mexican military.

In order to document the professionalization of the Mexican military and analyze the role it had in the decline of the military's political influence, it is obvious that we must first define the term "professionalism." Perhaps the definition provided by R.D. McKinlay is most useful for the purposes of this thesis, since it includes those dimensions of professionalism that consistently reappear in the

definitions provided by other scholars.⁷ In addition, McKinlay resists the temptation of defining professionalism in terms that relate to the level of political influence practiced by the military. In other words, the degree of professionalism possessed by the military will not depend on the level of political influence it possesses.

According to McKinlay, professionalism encompasses five concepts: expertise, institutional autonomy, internal controls, social responsibility, and corporateness.

Expertise indicates a high degree of generalized and systematic knowledge that is imparted to members through a formalized method of technical training. Furthermore, the training must include methods of validating both the level of training and the manner in which it is taught.

Institutional autonomy refers to the degree with which the profession is able to define and enforce those policies that fall within its own sphere of activity or competence. McKinlay believes that institutional autonomy is best measured by a formal system of demarcation that separates the profession from others. This would include the existence of formal legal documents that define the nature of the profession and its sphere of competence. As an example, institutional autonomy may be expressed through official policies that outline the profession's terms of

⁷R.D. McKinlay, "Professionalization, Politicization, and Civil-Military Relations," in <u>The Perceived role of the Military</u>, ed. M.R. Van Gils (Belgium: Rotterdam University Press, 1971), pp. 250-251.

employment and payment. A third and somewhat related dimension is McKinlay's discussion of internal controls. This refers to the development of self-controls of behavior that are internalized through either training or occupational socialization, and to the impartial application of the profession's rules and regulations.

The fourth concept, social responsibility, requires that the high degree of expertise referred to previously be applied to socially responsible uses. In other words, the orientation of this expertise must be applied towards community rather than personal, group, or organizational interests. As McKinlay states, "It is the social responsibility which distinguishes the professional man from other experts."

The final concept of professionalism is corporateness. According to McKinlay, this involves "the development of a collective sense of unity and the collective recognition of the clear differentiation of that body from other organizations." Other important determinants of corporateness include the degree of loyalty that the members profess for each other, the development of an egalitarian system of interaction, and the absence of any conflicts or divisions among its members.

⁸Ibid., p. 251.

⁹Ibid.

It is also necessary to define what is meant by political influence. Basically, this term refers to the ability of the military to shape and determine the policies of the national government, particularly those policies that directly impact the military. The most important measurement of political influence refers to the ability of the Mexican military to determine who will occupy the office of the presidency, as well as the length of the president's term. Other indicators of political influence include the number of military officers who occupy positions of political office, the ability of the military to determine and maintain the size of the military budget and the size of military troop strength, and the ability of the military to maintain an organizational structure that allows them to exercise a strong degree of political influence.

Structure

This thesis will begin with an extensive review of the literature on civil-military relations. This review will focus on, but is not limited to, the literature that deals specifically with military professionalism and political influence, and will concentrate primarily on the nations of Latin America. The main purpose of this review, which makes up Chapter 2, is to present the many theories concerning the relationship between military professionalism and political influence by analyzing the literature's major trends, and by taking note of both its contributions and its weaknesses.

The next two chapters focus on the case of Mexico during the years 1917-1940. Chapter 3 discusses the high level of political influence possessed by the military during the years of the Mexican Revolution, and then examines several indicators that point to a gradual but steady decline of the military's political influence. Chapter 4 focuses on the manner in which the Mexican military was professionalized. Specifically, this chapter shows how the several independent armies that emerged from the Mexican Revolution were gradually and systematically organized into a cohesive military institution. Most importantly, this professionalism was uniquely characterized by a revolutionary ideology that equated loyalty to the ideals of the Revolution with loyalty to the national government.

In Chapter 5, the main content of the thesis will conclude with an analysis of the role that professionalism played in limiting the role of the Mexican military. This is accomplished by identifying the unique aspects of the military's professionalization process and examining how they contributed to the decline of the military's political influence. Also, to understand the case of Mexico in relation to the general theory concerning political influence and military professionalism in Latin America, this chapter will analyze how these unique aspects apply to the body of theory presented in Chapter 2. It is my contention that the unique aspects of military professionalization identified in this chapter were largely

responsible for the decline of the Mexican military's political influence. In addition, the fact that these aspec's were unique to Mexico greatly clarifies why the professionalization of other Latin American militaries has not led to a similar decline in the political influence of these militaries. Finally, it is important to recognize that there were other factors in addition to military professionalism that contributed to the decline of the Mexican military's political influence. This chapter will address this issue as well.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Introduction

Since its beginnings following World War II, the field of civil-military relations has become accepted by scholars as a legitimate subject worthy of study. 1 This acceptance is an extremely welcome and important development for those who study Latin America, because the military in Latin America has always played a key role in the region's political, economic, and social structure. Within the broader field of civil-military relations, however, there exists a body of literature that focuses on the relationship between military professionalism and the armed forces' involvement in government politics. As stated in the introduction, many scholars believe that increased military professionalism will "depoliticize" the armed forces, while others argue that professionalization encourages the military to assume an active and even dominant role in politics. Thus, the purpose of this chapter will be to review the wide range of literature concerning this debate, especially as it pertains to Latin America, by analyzing the

¹Martin Edmonds, <u>Armed Forces and Society</u> (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), pp. 13-17.

literature's major trends, acknowledging its many contributions, and noting gaps and weaknesses still present.

Professionalism Lessens Political Influence: General Theory

In reviewing the literature associated with the theory that professionalism limits the military's political influence, it is clear that nearly all such literature is based on the work of one scholar: Samuel P. Huntington. The Soldier and the State, Huntington argues that "subjective civilian control," the more traditional approach to ensuring the military's responsiveness to civilian authority, detracts from the military's effectiveness at protecting the nation. Because its goal is to maximize the power of civilian groups in relation to the military, subjective control minimizes the power of the military by "civilianizing" it, and creates a military that mirrors the conflicting values of many civilian interest groups. 2 It is far better to establish "objective civilian control," which "militarizes" the military, separates military and civilian concerns, and thus maximizes both military responsiveness and effectiveness. For Huntington, the key to objective civilian control is professionalism, which he defines in terms of expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. As professionalism increases, the complex skills required by the military to master their vocation will also increase,

²Samuel P. Huntington, <u>The Soldier and the State</u> (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 80-97.

thereby consuming the overwhelming portion of their time and satisfying all their occupational needs. Thus, the interest of the armed forces is restricted purely to military concerns, causing them to become apolitical in their activities.

Huntington reflects a major trend in the historical development of professionalism in the U.S. military, and nearly every work concerning civil-military relations is influenced, positively or negatively, by his theories. However, a more common criticism of Huntington's theory is that political neutrality is inherent in his definition of professionalism.³ Thus, according to Huntington's definition, professional officers could never intervene in politics, because if they did, they would no longer be professional. This can be seen in Huntington's discussion of Hitler's attempt to control the German army, in which he states that those officers who either adopted Nazi views or assumed political roles actively opposing Hitler's policies "abandoned professionalism for politics."

Professionalism Increases Political Influence: General Theory

As opposed to Huntington, Morris Janowitz is less concerned with the existence of a completely apolitical military, as he is with a military that exercises less

³Bengt Abrahamsson, <u>Military Professionalization and Political Power</u> (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1972), p. 159.

⁴Huntington, <u>The Soldier and the State</u>, p. 121.

political influence relative to civilian government officials. 5 Janowitz believes that the social and technological changes that have occurred since World War II have affected both the military institution and the nature of international relations. As a result, the skills required of the military have become increasingly similar to civilian skills, while the present nature of international relations has made it impossible to distinguish between military and political action. The qualities that define the military officer as a professional must necessarily ad-pt to these conditions, and the military professional must therefore become sensitive to nonmilitary considerations. In the same manner, civilians must become sensitive to increasingly complex military considerations, and allow the military to share in the formation of government policy.

The key to limiting the military's political influence relative to that of civilians can be found in Janowitz's definition of professionalism. While he defines professionalism in terms of expertise, extensive education, group identity, ethics, and standards of performance, he does not include professional autonomy. Rather, it is civilians, with the military's participation, who establish standards and evaluate the performance of the military. Thus, while the present nature of the military profession

⁵Morris Janowitz, <u>The Professional Soldier</u>, a <u>Social</u> and <u>Political Portrait</u> (New York: The Free Press, 1971).

demands that he become politically influential, an important degree of autonomy is left in the hands of civilians.

Similar to Janowitz, Bengt Abrahamsson challenges the conclusion that professionalism will limit the military from political involvement. In his book, Military

Professionalization and Political Power, Abrahamsson argues that a highly professionalized military is like all other professional organizations, in that it is goal-seeking and concerned primarily with growth, improvement, and its own survival. It is precisely because they are professional that military leaders feel they have a responsibility to urge government leaders to accept their professional judgment. Thus, the greater the level of professionalization, the greater the probability that the military will be a politicized, highly active and motivated interest group with strong political values.

A third scholar, Amos Perlmutter, also criticizes
Huntington's theory. Perlmutter argues that Huntington's
theory of military professionalism is derived from the
classical tradition of administrative theory, which is built
on the premise that policymaking can be separated from
policy implementation. Under this concept, the
responsibility of politically elected officials can be

⁶Abrahamsson, <u>Military Professionalization and</u> Political Power, p. 17.

⁷Amos Perlmutter, <u>The Military and Politics in Modern</u>
<u>Times</u> (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1977),
p. 4.

distinguished from the responsibility of bureaucrats, a category that includes the military. According to Perlmutter, however, this theory no longer holds. Instead, the new theory of "fusionism" recognizes that the military, in the performance of its bureaucratic role, is a key partner of civilian politicians in the formation and implementation of national security policy. Professionalism contributes to this phenomenon in the sense that increased professionalism heightens the corporate identity of the military. Thus, as the military strives to maintain internal control of its profession, it feels compelled to become involved in politics.

Another scholar, Samuel E. Finer, presents three main reasons why the nature of professionalism, as defined by Huntington, will often lead to military intervention in government politics. In the first place, the military's awareness of themselves as professionals may cause them to believe that they are servants of the state rather than the particular government in power. Thus, the military will often intervene to remove the civilian government under the guise of national interest. Secondly, as specialists in their field, the military may feel that they alone are competent to judge on matters that directly affect their operation. Thus the motive to intervene becomes evident when the military and the civilian government disagree on

⁸Samuel E. Finer, <u>The Man on Horseback</u> (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), pp. 22-24.

such matters. Also, the military may be further tempted to intervene as a method for ensuring an economically and politically supportive civilian base. Thirdly, in the case where the military is called on to coerce the government's domestic opponents, the military may resent what they see as an unprofessional use of their power. The strain of this resentment may eventually cause the military to disobey or act against the government.

The strength of Janowitz's theory is that his definition of professionalism is not static in the same manner as Huntington's definition. Thus, Janowitz's concept of professionalism is able to adapt to changing external conditions, such as the convergence of military and political skills. However, one may easily disagree with Janowitz's observation that the blurring distinction between military and political action is a new development. Clausewitz, writing in the early 1800s, made the similar and now famous observation that "War is the continuation of politics by other means." In addition, although Janowitz's definition of professionalism does not preclude political involvement, he does not address how the military as a profession will be able to maintain its identity in the face of growing similarity between civilian and military roles, and therefore, how one will be able to distinguish between "civilian" political influence, and "military" political influence.

Perlmutter's discussion of "fusionism" is actually quite similar to Janowitz's analysis on the need for the military's involvement in policymaking. Yet, they differ on the relationship that professionalism has to this civilian-military partnership. For Janowitz, the concept of professionalism adapts to include the military's new role as political actors. For Perlmutter, professionalism appears to be an outside force that contributes to the likelihood that the partnership will exist.

Despite Abrahamsson's perceptive critique of Huntington's theory, it is evident that he does not so much offer a theory of civil-military relations, as point out that military professionalization cannot lead to an apolitical military. Nevertheless, Abrahamsson does add a new degree of sophistication to the literature by defining professionalism on two distinct levels. 9 In one sense, professionalism refers to the historical transformation of the military from a group of part-time, forcibly recruited soldiers, to a well-educated, technically and managerially trained corps of experts, recruited on the basis of achievement and skill. This meaning, known as professionalism₁, was the result of major social changes, such as the emergence of nation-states, the industrial revolution, the decline of the nobility, and various technological developments. In another sense,

⁹Abrahamsson, <u>Military Professionalization and</u> Political Power, pp. 16-17.

professionalism may be better described as professional socialization, or professionalism $_2$, and involves the indoctrination and internalization of certain values, outlooks, and behavior elements on an individual level.

Finer's book, recently updated, has been noted for its valuable contribution to the field of civil-military relations for the past thirty years. 10 To a certain degree, his analysis of professionalism seems to hold true especially in the case of Latin America. Yet, there is a lack of clarity in Finer's discussion of the negative effects of professionalism. He states that "the military's consciousness of themselves as a profession may lead them to see themselves as the servants of the state rather than of the government in power."11 While one may understand how this "servant of the state" mentality could lead to political intervention, one is still left wondering why professionalism would lead to this "servant of the state" mentality in the first place. In addition, Finer states that only when professionalism is combined with the tradition of civilian control, can it be seen as an important factor inhibiting political intervention. 12 However, given his general discussion of the negative effects of professionalism, it is difficult to understand

¹⁰ Edmonds, Armed Forces and Society, p. 76.

¹¹Finer, The Man on Horseback, p. 22.

¹²Ibid., pp. 20 and 26.

what it is about professionalism that now contributes to this seemingly contradictory conclusion.

Professionalism Lessens Political Influence: Latin America

Implicit support for Huntington's theory can be found in Edwin Lieuwen's book, Mexican Militarism. 13 Essentially, Lieuwen presents a narrative of the events that affected the Mexican military in the postrevolutionary era. Focusing specifically on the actions of the first four Mexican presidents after the Revolution, Lieuwen tells how they employed a three-fold strategy to establish control of the Mexican military. This strategy consisted of using armed labor and peasant militias to forcefully oppose any military rebellions, creating a new corps of professionally trained officers who understood the values of loyalty to the government, and developing a political party that eventually incorporated the peasant, labor, military, and popular or government factions into its control.

Lieuwen is more explicit in his beliefs concerning professionalism in an earlier work entitled <u>Arms and Politics in Latin America</u>. ¹⁴ In a short subchapter entitled "Growth of Professionalism," Lieuwen states that the professionalization of the Latin American militaries by

¹³ Edwin Lieuwen, <u>Mexican Militarism: The Political</u>
Rise and Fall of the Revolutionary Army, 1910-1940
(Albuquerque: The University of New Mexico Press, 1968).

^{1&}lt;sup>A</sup>Edwin Lieuwen, <u>Arms and Politics in Latin America</u> (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1960), pp. 151-153.

European military missions during the turn of the twentieth century acted as a strong counterforce against militarism.

Although Lieuwen acknowledges the post-1930 upsurge in military interventions, he attributes these to the "militarist" faction within the armed forces who were able to exert their will over the objections of the "professionalists." After World War II, Lieuwen states that the U.S. military continued the process of professionalizing the militaries of Latin America, concluding that

the attitudes of United States officers toward their profession and their role in society, and indeed the very training in the arts of war which they imported, could not have failed to influence in some degree the outlook and the attitudes of their Latin American colleagues. 15

In a dissertation that focuses on the political role of the Colombian Army, Robert William Studer examines why the Colombian Army has consistently maintained a low political profile in an apparently unsettled political and social environment. Studer's analysis leads him to believe that this phenomenon is caused by two factors: the antimilitaristic attitudes of Colombia's civilian political and intellectual elite, and the professionalization of the Colombian Army. In discussing the latter, Studer believes that there were four characteristics of the Colombian Army's professionalism that led to the adoption of civilian

¹⁵Ibid., p. 153.

¹⁶Robert William Studer, "The Colombian Army:
Political Aspects of Its Role" (Ph.D diss., University of
Southern California, 1975).

control. First, professionalism was initiated when there were several renowned military leaders who promoted the idea of separate civilian and military roles, and who supported the political leadership role of civilian officials.

Secondly, professionalization was based on the Prussian model, which, according to Studer, subjected the Colombian Army in its formative stage "to a strong emphasis on the pragmatic philosophy of military political neutrality."

Third, professionalization occurred during a period free of internal unrest and external threats, allowing the military elite more time and greater freedom to develop their professional ideology. Finally, the anti-military position of the civilian elite encouraged the army to focus on the mission of "objective service to the State as an excuse for being."

18

In one of the few attempts to analyze empirically the political behavior of Latin American military officers, Philip B. Springer has authored a work entitled "Social Sources of Political Behavior of Venezuelan Military Officers: An Exploratory Analysis." By correlating the kind and level of professional training and the degree of political activism of sixty-nine Venezuelan officers,

¹⁷Ibid., p. 67.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 71.

¹⁹Philip B. Springer, "Social Sources of Political
Behavior of Venezuelan Military Officers: An Exploratory
Analysis," Il Politico, Vol. 30, No. 2 (1965), pp. 348-355.

Springer draws several conclusions. For purposes of this essay, Springer's most interesting finding is that officers who have had advanced training in Venezuelan military schools were less likely to be politically active. Springer concludes that "advanced military education in Venezuela is not only technical but may also be a mechanism for socializing the officer to conform to norms of subordination to civil authority." Springer's attempt to gather data on Latin American military officers is important, because such data is extremely scarce. Unfortunately, the small number of officers examined by Springer makes it impossible to draw any significant conclusions.

While Lieuwen's <u>Mexican Militarism</u> is valuable for identifying such events as the creation of labor and peasant militias, the professionalization of the Mexican military, and the institutionalization of the political process, he does not employ any concepts offered by the theorists of civil-military relations; consequently, there is little in the way of in-depth analysis of how these events truly affected the political role of the military. It is almost as if Lieuwen assumes that because these events occurred prior to or coincident with the military's loss of political influence, they necessarily caused this depoliticization.

In reference to <u>Arms and Politics in Latin America</u>,
Lieuwen's assertion that European professionalization of the

²⁰Ibid., p.351.

Latin American militaries acted against militarism is strongly contested by Frederick M. Nunn, who convincingly argues just the opposite in his book, <u>Yesterday's Soldiers</u>. While this work is discussed in more detail in the next section, it is worth noting here that Nunn also discounts the influence of the U.S. military in South America, which Lieuwen felt was another important element in the professionalization process.²¹

Studer's belief that the Prussian model of professionalization contributed to the political subordination of the Colombian Army falls into the same category as Lieuwen's statement concerning the European military missions, and is therefore subject to the same criticism. It is curious that Studer would use the Prussian model as a reason for Colombia's stable civil-military relations when Argentina, whose military was also heavily influenced by the Prussian model, provides such an obvious contrast. Also curious is Studer's use of "objective service to the State" as a reason for the army's political neutrality. As illustrated in the discussion on Finer, "objective service to the State" is often seen as a reason for military intervention, not as a hindrance to it. Although the above criticisms are significant, Studer's work is still valuable for suggesting that there are unique historical factors within each country that may help explain

²¹Frederick M. Nunn, <u>Yesterday's Soldiers</u> (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), p. 179.

under what circumstances professionalism can limit military political influence.

Professionalism Increases Political Influence: Latin America

Among Latin Americanists, one of the best-known theories on the relationship between professionalism and political influence is Alfred Stepan's theory of "new professionalism."22 In explaining the expanding political roles of the highly professional Brazilian and Peruvian militaries during the 1960's, Stepan argues that Huntington's theory on military professionalism has often been misapplied, because it assumes that the military is developing its skills for conventional warfare against an external threat. However, during the 1950s and 1960s, Stepan notes that the militaries of Brazil and Peru began to focus on subversion and internal security due to the perceived threat of domestic revolution. Consequently, these militaries began to train their officers to acquire expertise in internal security matters that were defined as embracing all aspects of social, economic, and political life. Thus, Stepan feels that Huntington's definition of professionalism, which he calls "old" professionalism, is not applicable to Brazil and Peru. Rather it is the "new" professionalism, as defined by its mission of internal

²²Alfred Stepan, "The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion" in <u>Authoritarian</u> <u>Brazil</u>, ed. Alfred Stepan (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1976).

security and national development, that has caused the Brazilian and Peruvian militaries to become highly politicized.

Stepan's work is unique because it is one of the few theories that does not overtly refute Huntington's theory, but seeks to expand and modify it in the case of Brazil and In addition, many scholars have accepted and used his theory of "new professionalism" in their works. Despite this popularity, however, several articles have been written questioning its accuracy. The most critical review of Stepan's argument is an article written by John Markoff and Silvio R. Duncan Baretta, in which they question whether the Brazilian military's adoption of the "new professionalism" mission is really a new development at all.²³ They point to many examples in past Brazilian history, particularly the Estado Novo period of 1937-1945, to illustrate the strong military presence in government prior to the 1964 coup. In conclusion, they believe that the 1960s slogan "Segurança e Desenvolvimento" is little more than a variation on "Ordem e Progresso." This point is also clearly brought out in an excellent article by José Murilo de Carvalho. 24 In this article, Carvalho presents a document written in 1934 by

²³John Markoff and Silvio R. Duncan Baretta, "Professional Ideology and Military Activism in Brazil: Critique of a Thesis of Alfred Stepan," <u>Comparative</u> <u>Politics</u>, Vol. 17 (January, 1985), pp. 175-191.

²⁴José Murilo de Carvalho, "Armed Forces and Politics
in Brazil, 1930-1945," <u>Hispanic American Historical Review</u>,
Vol. 62 (May, 1982), pp. 193-223.

General Góes Monteiro to President Getúlio Vargas. Sounding very much like the "new professionalism" ideology of internal security and national development, the document lists a long series of economic and political measures, including the promotion of national industry, regulation of economic life, and reform of the state apparatus.

Markoff and Baretta also question if Huntington's concept of "old professionalism" ever accurately described the Brazilian military. This same observation is made in an article by Frank McCann, where he states that "Stepan pyramided his assumptions in such a fashion and marshaled his data so adroitly that one nearly forgets to ask if the first premise [old professionalism] is correct."25 However, a close reading will clearly show that Stepan never suggests that the Brazilian military once embodied characteristics of "old professionalism." Perhaps the confusion lies in Stepan's use of the terms "old professionalism" and "new professionalism." While "new professionalism" pertains to the changes in Brazilian military thought after World War II, "old professionalism" does not apply to the previous era of military ideology in Brazil, but only to Huntington's classical definition of the term.

Focusing on an earlier period than Stepan, Frederick M. Nunn theorizes in his book, <u>Yesterday's Soldiers</u>, that the

²⁵Frank McCann, "Origins of the 'New Professionalism' of the Brazilian Military," <u>Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs</u>, Vol. 21 (November, 1979), pp. 505-522.

political interventions undertaken by the armed forces in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru were a direct result of military professionalization during the period 1890 to 1940. For Nunn, the roots of this professionalization stemmed from the French and Garman military missions that had been sent to these countries prior to World War I. Although the French and German militaries did not repeatedly intervene in government politics, they were nevertheless a vital and significant ingredient in the political process of their government. The real distinction between the armed forces of pre-World War II Europe and South America, Nunn feels, was not in professional military attitudes, but in the resistance of French and German civilian institutions to military political influence. Eventually, by 1940, military professionalism in South America would manifest itself as "professional militarism," which Nunn defines as "the propensity and willingness to apply solutions based on a military ethos to social, economic, and political problems."26

Nunn provides a needed historical background to civilmilitary relations in South America that adds to Stepan's
work by explaining military involvement in government
politics before World War II. It also provides a convincing
counterargument to earlier works, such as those by Lieuwen
and Studer, that laud the accomplishments of the European

²⁶Frederick M. Nunn, Yesterday's Soldiers, p. 2.

military missions. For the most part, these earlier works fail to analyze the organization and attitudes of the European military missions, and the effects they had in Latin America, to the degree accomplished by Nunn. However, Latin American militaries intervened in the government long before the arrival of these military missions, and Nunn's theory does not address this issue. Part of the answer may lie in Brian Loveman and Thomas Davies' book, The Politics of Antipolitics. In the sense that the military was really a poorly trained and equipped army whose only loyalty was to a caudillo, the authors imply that there were no military interventions in Latin America prior to the establishment of professional armies, since the military as an institution did not yet exist.²⁷ Still, Loveman and Davies do see the caudillos as having left a large influence on the political behavior of the professional armies, an influence that Nunn does not explore. According to Loveman and Davies:

Although the creation of the Latin American nations was to a large extent a military achievement, in many cases it was only through the ventures of nationalistic caudillos that the territorial units of Latin America were forged and maintained against European as well as Latin American enemies. As the age of caudillos gave way to that of civilian politics, the successors of the caudillos—the professional military—often saw in the venality and incapacity of civilian elites a betrayal of nations which the military had founded.

In contrast, these modern-day military officers view with respect the regimes of the great caudillos in their nations' past. Not only did the caudillos shape and

²⁷Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies Jr., eds., <u>The Politics of Antipolitics: The Military in Latin America</u> (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1978), p. 28.

defend the fatherland, but they also did it with firmness (even violence) and with dedication. They alone prevented the national disintegration which would have resulted from "politics." In short, they successfully applied the politics of antipolitics and in so doing served as vital links between traditional Hispanic politics and the antipolitical military regimes of today. ²⁸

In an article that draws on the work of both Stepan and Nunn, J. Samuel Fitch distinguishes between the classical concept of military professionalism and a politicized concept of professionalism. 29 Like Nunn, Fitch argues that the Latin American militaries' original process of professionalization was carried out under the influence of the European military missions. However, Fitch states that the classical concept of professionalization, which he equates with civilian control of the military, was not completely adopted in Latin America because of two historical factors. First, the mission of the armed forces included "internal order" as well as external defense, which thus gave the military a strong anti-socialist (later anticommunist) orientation early in their development. Secondly, military allegiance to civilian control was often conditional, in contrast to the unconditional obedience stressed in classical professionalism, as both elite groups and rising middle-class parties cultivated military alliances. Thus, Fitch concludes, the original concept of

²⁸Ibid., p. 28.

²⁹Samuel J. Fitch, "Military Professionalism, National Security and Democracy: Lessons from the Latin American Experience," <u>Pacific Focus</u> Vol. 4 (Fall, 1989), pp. 99-147.

military professionalism was never totally applicable to
Latin American militaries, and instead of apolitical
professionals, the military became a privileged politicized
elite. Like Stepan, Fitch believes that the focus on
national security by the Latin American militaries after
World War II completely erased the boundary between civilian
and military roles. The blurring of this boundary, on which
the anti-interventionist argument of classic professionalism
relied, led to a permanently politicized military that used
the state to control society.

Fitch's analysis is important because it adds a new dimension to Nunn's analysis of the influence provided by the European military missions. Whereas Nunn sees the European military ideology transferring nearly intact to the Latin American militaries, Fitch believes that there were certain historical factors in Latin America that modified the western concept of professionalism, and thus allowed for the existence of a professional military that was also a powerful political actor. This does not totally discredit Nunn's work, however, for both Fitch and Nunn are partially correct, as well as partially in error. Fitch is correct in recognizing that concepts and ideologies cannot transfer from one culture to another without undergoing some degree of modification, yet he errs in not recognizing that the western concept of professionalism was, in practice, highly politicized. Nunn is correct in identifying the serious consequences to South America caused by the actual

implementation of western professionalism, but he errs by failing to understand how the militaries of South America may have modified the concept to serve their own purposes.

Another major theory of civil-military relations in Latin America is José Nun's "middle-class military coup."30 According to Nun, in a reversal of the situation in Western Europe, the armed forces of Latin America were professionalized in preindustrial societies where the hegemony of the bourgeoisie was not yet established. "early" professionalization had two consequences: careers were open to the middle class through the creation of military academies; and the military, in contrast to the organizationally weak middle class, emerged as a group possessing an unusual degree of institutional coherence and articulation."31 Thus, in the face of competition for power from the traditional elite and an aggressive working class, the military, as the institution most representative of the middle class, intervenes to "compensate for its [the middle class| incapacity to constitute itself as a hegemonic class."32

Both Stepan and Fitch challenge Nun's theory of the "middle-class military coup." While Stepan acknowledges

³⁰ José Nun, <u>Latin America: The Hegemonic Crisis and the Military Coup</u> (Berkeley: University of California, 1969).

³¹Ibid., p. 21.

³²Ibid., p. 56.

that the middle class often urges the military to intervene in the political process, he argues that all political groups do this regardless of class origin. 33 Both Stepan and Fitch are suspicious of the belief that the military truly associates with the interests and values of the middle class, and would therefore intervene primarily on their behalf. They point to their own research on Brazil and Ecuador as proof that the military is much more likely to intervene to protect its own institutional interests. 34 In reference to Nun's assertion that "early" professionalization of the Latin American militaries led to the formation of a cohesive and articulate institution, this may not have been true for all nations. One need only refer to Carvalho's article on the Brazilian military. Well after the French military mission began its professionalization of the Brazilian armed forces in 1919, Carvalho shows how badly divided and undisciplined the Brazilian military truly was during the years 1930-1945.35

In one of the few works that directly considers the impact of professionalization on the Mexican military, William S. Ackroyd constructs a model that notes how

³³Alfred Stepan, <u>The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil</u> (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 46.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 46-48., and Samuel J. Fitch, <u>The Military Coup d'Etat as a Political Process</u> (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), pp. 125-128.

 $^{^{35}}$ Carvalho, "Armed Forces and Politics in Brazil, 1930-1945," pp. 193-200.

different levels of military professionalism will result in different forms of political influence. 36 According to the model, low or nonexistent levels of professionalism are likely to result in military coups, while high levels of professionalism will increase the probability of military participation. The nature of military participation, characterized as either military intervention/domination (MID) or civilian domination/military partnership (CDMP), is dependent upon the level of "civilian professionalization," or the competence level of civilian government officials in the performance of their duties. In the case of Mexico, the military holds the view that the civilian politicians are sufficiently competent to govern relative to the military's own level of professional training and behavior. Ackroyd states that the Mexican military participates in the government as a subordinate partner of the civilian politicians, and therefore characterizes Mexican civilmilitary relations as CDMP.

Given the work of Stepan, Nunn, Fitch, and a host of other scholars, the majority of the work on civil-military relations in Latin America tends to focus on South America. Thus, Ackroyd's work on Mexico fills a significant gap in this area. Especially interesting is Ackroyd's recognition

³⁶William S. Ackroyd, "The Military in Mexican Politics: The Impact of Professionalism, Civilian Behavior and the Revolution," <u>Proceedings of the Pacific Coast Council on Latin American Studies</u> Vol. 12 (1986), pp. 93-107.

of the importance of civilian professionalism, which is often overlooked by those scholars who focus only on the military. Unfortunately, Ackroyd does not address the historical process of Mexico's military professionalization, or how this process may have contributed to a policical environment in which the military, which had once exercised a dominating role, now participates as a subordinate partner to the civilian politicians.

<u>Current State of the Literature: The Call for</u> Re-Professionalization

Given our discussion so far, it appears that works written in the late 1950s through the mid 1960s favor the conclusion that military professionalism lessens the politicization of the military, while scholars writing after this period present theories and case studies that disprove these earlier studies. In particular, scholars who specialize in Latin America have been able to draw upon case studies from many South and Central American countries, in which a highly professionalized military has become actively involved in politics, to refute these earlier works. Yet, within this later period, one detects the beginning of an interesting new trend among some of the most recent literature on Latin America, a trend that advocates the return of professionalism on the grounds that it will lead to a more stable civil-military relationship.

In an article entitled "Civil-Military Relations and Argentine Democracy," author Paul W. Zagorski begins by

illustrating how Argentina's history has clearly shown that military professionalism has not ensured civilian control of the military. The Beginning with Juan Perón's overthrow by the military in 1955, Zagorski recounts how many civilian governments have attempted, with poor results, to establish control over an extremely professional military. However, in the aftermath of the disastrous Falklands/Malvinas war and subsequent collapse of the military government, Zagorski believes that the succeeding administration of Raúl Alfonsín may have the greatest probability for stabilizing civilmilitary relations in Argentina. Ironically, this probability rests on developing a new role for the military based on a nonpolitical version of professionalism. In a sense, Alfonsín is attempting to "re-professionalize" the military.

Alfonsin's strategy, according to Zagorski, involved changing the doctrine of the military from one based on national security to one based on external defense. For this "nonpolitical professionalization" to be successful, it would be necessary to break the link between the military and their allied civilian sectors, and reduce the level of military autonomy. In response to Alfonsin's directives, changes have been made in the curricula of military schools, military planning and strategy was made a function of the

³⁷Paul W. Zagorski, "Civil-Military Relations and Argentine Democracy," <u>Armed Forces and Society</u> Vol. 14 (Spring 1988), pp. 407-432.

president and his cabinet, military privileges have been curtailed, military expenditures, excluding those committed to external defense, have been greatly reduced, and defense industries formerly managed by the military have been put under civilian control.

In a second article concerning military professionalism in Argentina, Deborah L. Norden argues that Alfonsín has erroneously pursued a strategy of de-militarization, rather than true re-professionalization of the military, with the effect of further destabilizing civil-military relations. 38 Norden believes that Alfonsín has followed a strategy along the lines of Huntington's "subjective civilian control," which seeks to weaken the military in order to divorce it from politics. This strategy is faulty, states Norden, because, unlike the "new professionalism" ideology of the past, the post-Malvinas Argentine military now defines professionalism in line with Huntington's vision of "objective civilian control," which recognizes the classic division of civilian and military tasks within the state. As a consequence, the military views Alfonsín's actions for subjective control as an attack on their newfound professionalism.

In response to Alfonsín's policies, several rebellions took place in 1987 and 1988 that, according to Norden, were

³⁸ Deborah L. Norden, "Democratic Consolidation and Military Professionalism: Argentina in the 1980s," <u>Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs</u> Vol. 32 (1990), pp. 151-176.

made for purely military purposes, not political ones.³⁹
For Norden, this serves as greater proof that the military was concerned only with protecting its sense of professionalism. However, as the strain of Alfonsín's reforms became more severe, the rebellion movement began to consolidate into a political group known as the <u>carapintadas</u>, who decided to campaign openly for Carlos Menem, the Peronist candidate opposing Alfonsín. Thus, concludes Norden, by weakening the military, rather than truly re-professionalizing it, the Alfonsín administration has actually re-politicized a key sector of the military.

A third article, written by Stanley H. Hilton, traces the changing strategic mission of the Brazilian military, and the consequences this has had on the military's political role. 40 Beginning with the successive military regimes between 1964 and 1974, Hilton characterizes the mission of the military as one focused on subversion and industrialization. After the early seventies however, certain developments, such as the increasingly tense relations with Argentina, the expansion of Soviet naval activities in the Atlantic, and the growing technical sophistication of warfare, convinced the Brazilian military that a more generalized war from an external threat was a

³⁹Ibid., pp. 168-169.

⁴⁰Stanley E. Hilton, "The Brazilian Military: Changing Strategic Perceptions and the Question of Mission," <u>Armed Forces and Society Vol. 13</u> (Spring 1987), pp. 329-351.

distinct possibility. As a consequence, the military has sought to improve electronic warfare capabilities, develop aerospace and nuclear technology, modernize its weapons, and implement personnel and organizational changes. According to Hilton, the mission reorientation away from internal security and toward external defense has raised the level of military professionalism, and has thus had the effect of greatly reducing the political role of the military. In Hilton's own words, "Certainly there would seem to be an implicit incompatibility between the exercise of direct political responsibility and the reorientation of mission toward external defense with its resultant heightened demand for professionalism."⁴¹

From an examination of the above three articles, it is clear that the term "professionalization" can be defined in different ways. What Zagorski describes as "nonpolitical professionalization" in the case of Argentina, Norden sees as subjective civilian control, the antithesis of Huntington's concept of professionalism. The one part of Alfonsín's strategy that Norden may agree with is the attempt to break the link between military and civilian allies, which will serve to "militarize" the military. Clearly, however, Norden sees the reduction of military autonomy as a severe setback if true military professionalization is to take place. Hilton believes the

⁴¹Ibid., p. 346.

situation in Brazil to be somewhat different from Argentina, for he describes the "re-professionalization" of the military as a movement that was internally generated by the military, not the government. Thus, with the military in greater control of its development, Hilton's definition of professionalism tends to follow the course advocated by Norden. Regardless of any noted differences in defining professionalism, however, it is ironic that all three articles advocate or document the call for increased military professionalization in Latin America.

Conclusion

Given the above discussion, one easily discovers that the literature concerning the relationship between military professionalism and political influence has come full circle. The original advocates of professionalism, who believed that such action would lessen the degree of military influence in the government, witnessed very few cases where their theories proved correct. Predictably, later scholars came up with several new theories to explain why professionalism did in fact lead to the military's increased political influence. Now with the drastic fall of

⁴²Despite the evidence provided in Hilton's article, it is not totally accurate to portray the "reprofessionalization" movement as one that was strictly generated from within the Brazilian military. While the Brazilian military may not have had to contend with something as drastic as the Falkland/Malvinas War, the breakdown of the Brazilian economy under a military government was certainly a factor that led to the military's reduced political role.

military supported governments in Latin America, the topic of professionalism is once again being discussed as a way to ensure that military and civilian roles remain separate.

Of the literature concerned specifically with Latin America, clearly Argentina and Brazil have received the most This is understandable since they not only possess highly professional militaries with a history of strong political influence, but they are also seen as two of the leading nations within Latin America. Yet, it is puzzling that there has not been an in-depth analysis of the relationship between professionalism and military political influence in Mexico, another leading Latin American nation, but one where an apparently stable civil-military relationship has existed for the past fifty years. of the theories on professionalism and their application to Latin America, Mexico thus seems to be an unusual case, since professionalization of the military occurred coincident with the loss of political influence. Therefore, let us now turn our attention to Mexico, where we will begin with an examination of the military's declining political influence during the years 1917-1940.

CHAPTER 3

POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF THE MEXICAN MILITARY

Introduction

Although Mexico has had a military since colonial times, the Mexican military of today had its origins in the violent upheaval known as the Mexican Revolution. However, when examining this period in Mexico's history, the term "military," must be used cautiously. In reality, it is misleading to think of the Mexican military during these years as a cohesive institution that could exert and implement its will as a united force. As will become clear, the Mexican military of the revolutionary era was really a loose confederation of revolutionary generals whose command over their personal armies allowed them great flexibility in supporting particular administrations, rebelling in favor of others, deserting former allies, and creating alliances with one-time enemies. Gradually, however, the revolutionary forces would come to form a cohesive military institution,

¹For example, upon the death of Colonel Cecilio Luna in 1916, papers in his wallet revealed he had fought for Francisco I. Madero against Porfirio Díaz, for General Pascual Orozco against Madero, for General Alvaro Obregón against Orozco, for General Benjamín Hill against General Victoriano Huerta, for General José María Maytorena against Hill, and for General Pancho Villa against Obregón. This case is cited in Edwin Lieuwen, Mexican Militarism: The Political Rise and Fall of the Revolutionary Army, 1910-1940 (Albuquerque: The University of New Mexico Press, 1968), p. 33.

with the first steps being taken through the formation of the Constitutionalist Army in 1913 and the National Army in 1917.

Whether these armed forces were more characteristic of independent armies or a cohesive military institution, it was impossible to deny that they possessed a strong degree of political influence. In fact, given the critical role these armed forces played during the Revolution and the resultant widespread violence and social upheaval, it is not an exaggeration to say that Mexico's armed forces, whether they existed as revolutionary forces or as a military institution, were the final arbiter of politics and, in particular, of decisions about who would serve as president.

Nevertheless, in the years following the Revolution, the political influence of the Mexican military steadily declined. Thus, this chapter will examine several indicators that document this decline by analyzing such factors as the ability of the military to influence the process of presidential succession, the number of officers holding political offices, the percentage of the national budget devoted to the military, the size of the military, and the number of military zones. However, before we examine these indicators, it will be helpful to first understand the role these armed forces played during the years of the Revolution.

The Military of the Revolution, 1910-1917

Table 1 shows the presidential successions for the first phase of the Revolution, covering the years 1910-1914.

After decades of dictatorship under Díaz, the use of military power became the only way of effecting political change, a phenomenon that largely explains the manner in which presidential succession occurred during these years.

Table 1
Presidential Successions, 1911-1914

Dates of Administration	President	
Dec. 1, 1881- May 25, 1911	Gen. Porfirio Díaz	
May 25, 1911- Nov. 5, 1911	Francisco León de la Barra	
Nov.6, 1911- Feb. 19, 1913	Francisco I. Madero	
Feb. 19, 1913	Pedro Lascuráin	
Feb. 19, 1913- July 15, 1914	Gen. Victoriano Huerta	
July 15, 1914- Aug. 13, 1914	Francisco Carbajal	

Source: Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico, p. 685.

The call to overthrow Díaz is usually associated with the efforts of a civilian named Francisco I. Madero, although he possessed little of the resources to accomplish this feat.² The real power for defeating Díaz came from a

²Numerous sources can be consulted to trace the beginning events of the Mexican Revolution. Some of the most useful include Alan Knight, <u>The Mexican Revolution</u>, ²Vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), Robert E. Quirk, <u>The Mexican Revolution</u>, 1914-1915 (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1962), Ernest Gruening, <u>Mexico and its Heritage</u> (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), John Womack, Jr., <u>Zapata and the Mexican Revolution</u> (New

powerful yet disjointed effort by the military forces of Pancho Villa and Pascual Orozco in the north, and Emiliano Zapata in the south. At this point, one must still remember that rebel armies were much closer in reality to poorly disciplined bands of guerrilla warriors, with members drawn from almost every conceivable social and economic class, than they were to the well equipped and trained armies envisioned today. Nevertheless, in only six months after Madero's call to revolt in November of 1910, Díaz, militarily defeated by revolutionary forces, resigned the presidency and fled to France. Francisco León de la Barra was then named provisional president of Mexico until official elections brought Madero in as president in 1911.

In what proved to be a fateful policy, Madero sought to reform the Mexican government while leaving the political and military structures of the Díaz regime intact. 4 This provoked a number of revolts, most notably those of Zapata and Orozco. Unfortunately, Madero commissioned General Victoriano Huerta, a prominent member of Díaz's still intact Federal Army, to put down the rebellions. Huerta not only put down the rebellions, but he also engineered a coup in

York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), and Charles C. Cumberland, <u>Mexican Revolution</u>, <u>Genesis Under Madero</u> (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1952).

³Ernest Gruening, <u>Mexico and its Heritage</u>, p. 308-309.

⁴Knight, <u>The Mexican Revolution</u>, Vol. 1: <u>Porfirians</u>, <u>Liberals and Peasants</u>, pp. 448-466.

which the <u>porfiristas</u> once again came to power. Huerta forced Madero and his vice-president to resign and eventually ordered their execution with the full knowledge that Pedro Lascuráin, the foreign minister, would then become president in accordance with constitutional law.

Lascuráin proceeded to appoint Huerta Secretary of Interior, the position next in line after the foreign minister for president, and then resigned himself, thereby letting Huerta succeed "constitutionally" to the presidency.⁵

Although Huerta was now the official president of Mexico, several prominent leaders who had supported Madero refused to recognize the legitimacy of Huerta's rule.

Venustiano Carranza, the governor of Coahuila, announced his decision not to recognize Huerta, and soon found military support from Villa in Chihuahua, and General Alvaro Obregón in Sonora. The alliance of the northern revolutionaries was formally announced in the <u>Plan de Guadalupe</u>, which named Carranza as <u>Primer Jefe</u> of the newly formed

Constitutionalist Army. Zapata did not ally himself with the Constitutional Army, but his rebel movement in southern Mexico forced Huerta to divert a significant portion of his resources from the north. Facing strong armies in the north and south, and a potential invasion from American forces that now occupied Veracruz, Huerta resigned and left

⁵Ibid., pp. 488-489.

⁶Womack, <u>Zapata and the Mexican Revolution</u>, pp. 186-187.

Francisco Carbajal as interim president.⁷ As a prelude to the kind of political maneuvering that would characterize the actions of Mexico's military leaders for many years, Carranza insured that his forces, led by Obregón, would reach Mexico City before the armies of Villa and Zapata.⁸ Having secured Carbajal's resignation and the surrender of the Federal Army, Carranza now controlled Mexico City. However, the struggle for permanent control of all of Mexico was just beginning.

The next phase of the Mexican Revolution is much more characteristic of a civil war, in which the loosely united but triumphant revolutionary forces soon began to divide and struggle among themselves for the right to rule Mexico.

Table 2 shows the existence of two concurrent governments that grew out of the turbulent events of this era, an era that was fully controlled by the powerful generals of the Revolution.

In early October of 1914, a convention of military delegates representing Carranza, Villa, and Zapata was held

⁷Given the circumstances in which Huerta came to power, U.S. president Woodrow Wilson refused to recognize Huerta's government. In an attempt to aid the Constitutionalist forces in ousting Huerta, Wilson ordered a naval occupation of Veracruz on April 21, 1914. Much to Wilson's dismay, the Constitutionalists condemned the occupation. See Robert E. Quirk, An Affair of Honor, Woodrow Wilson and the Occupation of Veracruz (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1962), pp. 73-77 and 115-117.

⁸Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 1914-1915, pp. 53-56.

Table 2
Presidential Successions, 1914-1917

Dates of Administration President		
Government of the Constitutional	Convention	
Nov. 6, 1914- Jan. 16, 1915	Gen. Eulalio Gutiérrez	
Jan. 16, 1915- Jun. 10, 1915	Gen. Roque González Garza	
Jun 10, 1915- Jul. 9, 1915	Francisco Lagos Cházaro	
Pre-Constitutional Regime		
Nov. 6, 1914- May 1, 1917	Venustiano Carranza	

Source: Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico, p. 685.

in the town of Aguascalientes to settle the question of how the future government of Mexico should be structured. The qualifications for a delegate were based on one representative for every one thousand troops; the convention therefore consisted of 115 <u>carrancistas</u>, 37 <u>villistas</u>, and 26 <u>zapatistas</u>. Garranza fully intended to dominate the convention so that he would be elected president. Instead, the convention took on an increasingly radical tone, voting to incorporate Zapata's principles of agrarian reform as specified in the Plan de Ayala, and electing General Eulalio Gutiérrez to serve as president. Carranza, backed by the military might of Obregón, denounced the convention and recalled his delegates. Now it was Carranza who was technically in rebellion, and as Villa's powerful Division

⁹Lieuwen, <u>Mexican Militarism</u>, p. 30.

¹⁰Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 1914-1915, pp. 114118, and Womack, Zapata and the Mexican Revolution, pp. 214216.

of the North moved on to Mexico City to install Gutiérrez in the presidency, Carranza withdrew to Veracruz where he established his Pre-Constitutional Regime. 11

Despite Gutiérrez's position as president, the absence of Carranza meant that Villa now held the real power in Mexico City, although there was a certain degree of cooperation with Zapata and his peasant army from Morelos. 12 As the presence of Villa and Zapata's troops began to disrupt the capital, Gutiérrez soon realized that both Villa and Zapata lacked the ability to bring political stability to Mexico. He began to make conciliatory moves to Obregón to join the Conventionist government in confronting both Carranza and Villa, but was forced to flee from the capital once Villa discovered his plans. 13

General Roque González Garza, a staunch supporter of Villa, followed Gutiérrez as president of the Conventionist government. In the months to follow, a serious rift developed between the <u>villista</u> and <u>zapatista</u> delegates who made up the Conventionist government, and as the <u>zapatistas</u> came to dominate the assembly, González Garza was forced to resign. 14 Francisco Lagos Cházaro then became president,

¹¹Kright, The Mexican Revolution, Vol. 2: Counterrevolution and Reconstruction, p. 263, and Womack, Zapata and the Mexican Revolution, pp. 219-223.

¹²Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 1914-1915, p. 149.

¹³Ibid., pp.155-167.

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 176-258.

but by this time Villa's forces had suffered a spectacular defeat by Obregón at the battle of Celaya, and the president was unable to prevent the Constitutionalists from capturing Mexico City in 1915. Carranza's struggle to become the legitimate ruler of Mexico was then given a large boost when the United States government extended official recognition to the Carranza regime in October of 1915. 15

The Process of Presidential Succession, 1917-1940 In hindsight, the use of military force by the revolutionary generals as a means of attaining political influence during the Revolution was really a prelude to the manner in which they would attempt to exercise political influence in the years after the Revolution. Nevertheless, the tradition of using military force as the primary means of exerting political influence gradually became less and less effective during this era. Undoubtedly, these generals would still maintain a degree of political influence, but in relation to the previous era, they would be forced to share political power with other groups, and to exert their influence within prearranged boundaries. As an examination of the presidential successions and concurrent military rebellions during the years 1917-1940 will clearly show, the direct use of military force to decide who would occupy the presidency became less practical. Therefore, many generals lost a

¹⁵Douglas W. Richmond, <u>Venustiano Carranza's</u>
<u>Nationalist Struggle, 1893-1920</u> (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), p. 82.

Table 3
Presidential Successions, 1917-1940

President		
Venustiano Carranza		
Adolfo de la Huerta		
Gen. Alvaro Obregón		
Gen. Plutarco Elías Calles		
Emilio Portes Gil		
Gen. Pascual Ortiz Rubio		
Gen. Abelardo L. Rodríguez		
Gen. Lázaro Cárdenas		

Source: Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico, p. 685.

Table 4
Major Military Rebellions, 1920-1940

President	Date of Rebellion	Size of Rebellion Suc	cessful?	
Carranza	1920	274 generals (97%), vast majority of troops	Yes	
Obregón	1923	102 generals(20%), 573 colonels and majors(23%), 2,417 other officers (28%), 23,224 troops(39%)	No	
Calles	1927	28 generals, 20% of the troops	No	
Portes Gil	1929	5 generals, 30% of the officers, 17,000 troops(28%)	No	
Cárdenas	1938	1 general and his private army	No	
Source: Lieuwen, "Depoliticization of the Mexican Revolutionary Army, 1915-1940," pp. 52-53, Lieuwen, Mexican Militarism, pp. 54, 99, 103, 126, Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico, pp. 36, 442, Quiros Martínez, Alvaro Obregón, p. 197.				

certain degree of political influence that they previously possessed during the first years of the Revolution. Table 3 lists the presidents for the period 1917-1940. Although

this period is over three times as long as the period 1910-1917, the frequency of presidential successions is still less than that witnessed during the first seven years of the Revolution. Except for Carranza, the decrease in the number of presidential successions can be attributed to the fact that the presidents, quite often generals themselves, were able to complete their term without being forced out of office by dissatisfied military forces. 16 As shown in Table 4, in spite of the many rebellions that took place, what is most notable about this period is that military rebellions were successful only once in forcing a change in the presidency. To trace this decreasing political influence of the Mexican military during the years 1917-1940, it will be necessary to examine closely the nature of presidential successions and the numerous rebellions that accompanied them.

The overthrow of Carranza in 1920 by Obregón and the vast majority of the military forces was quite different from the uprisings and violence associated with the previous period of civil warfare witnessed during the years 1914-1917. To begin with, the military was clearly united

¹⁶From 1920 to 1928, presidential terms were four years, but in 1927, the constitution was amended to extend the term to six years. Although Obregón had won the 1928 election, he was assassinated by a religious fanatic before he could serve his term. Portes Gil then served as interim president until elections could be held. Ortiz Rubio was elected to complete Obregón's term, but later resigned, and Rodríguez was named by congress to serve as interim president until the 1934 elections.

against Carranza, as opposed to the large followings that Carranza, Villa, and Zapata had previously commanded in their quest for control. Secondly, the rebellion was preceded by a period in which Obregón attempted to achieve the presidency through political means, without the use of military force. 17 Obregón began to campaign for the presidency in 1919 after building popular political support during his term as Carranza's Secretary of War. Since Carranza's presidency, Obregón had won the support of the military, the labor movement, and the two major political parties, the Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (PLC) and the Partido Nacional Cooperatista (PNC). 18 Lastly, due to the small number of revolutionary generals who remained loyal to Carranza, the uprising saw little actual fighting and was over within a month.

Although the <u>obregonista</u> coup once again confirmed the importance of the military in deciding the presidency, it is interesting that, unlike the previous rebellions, the coup occurred towards the end of the president's legitimate term in office. Despite Carranza's adoption of the liberal Constitution of 1917, which promised agrarian, labor, religious, and educational reforms, his rule showed little adherence to such ideals. In truth, Carranza's

¹⁷Linda B. Hall, <u>Alvaro Obregón: Power and Revolution in Mexico, 1911-1920</u> (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1981), p. 203.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 200.

administration was marked by marginal land reform, suppression of trade unions, limited construction of schools, poor enforcement of the laws limiting the power of the Church, and little effort to replace private or foreign ownership with communal or state ownership. 19 While these conservative policies were unpopular with large portions of the military, the real impetus for rebellion began when Carranza refused to support Obregón's campaign and attempted to impose a relative unknown, Ignacio Bonillas, as the next president. 20 When Carranza attempted to remove Obregón from the campaign by charging him with conspiracy, and then sent a federal contingent to Sonora, Obregón's principal base of political support, Carranza faced a full scale rebellion and was forced to flee. The Mexican Congress then named Adolfo de la Huerta as provisional president until Obregón's official election to the office of president in December of 1920.

The 1920 coup that defeated Carranza and established Obregón in the presidency is noteworthy for two reasons. First, despite presidential policies that became increasingly conservative and unpopular with the military, they did not seek to oust Carranza until it was clear that

¹⁹Frank Brandenburg, <u>The Making of Modern Mexico</u> (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 57.

²⁰Douglas W. Richmond, "Carranza: The Authoritarian Populist as Nationalist President," in <u>Essays on the Mexican Revolution</u>, eds. George Wolfskill and Douglas W. Richmond (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979), p. 74.

he wanted to extend his authority beyond that specified in the Constitution of 1917. In other words, the military did not challenge the legitimacy of Carranza's presidency, but rather the informal extension of this presidency. This would set the pattern for future significant rebellions, which would now generally occur during the transition from one presidential administration to another. Second, and most important, the coup of 1920 marked the last time that military force would be successful in overturning the government. While the political influence of the many independent and unpredictable revolutionary generals would be manifest in other ways, this avenue of effecting political change, a successful coup using the military, would not recur.

Like the coup in 1920, the 1923 military rebellion coincided with the coming presidential succession, and was preceded by the incumbent president's effort to impose a president that was unacceptable to certain factions within the military. Continuing the pattern established in 1920, those generals who did not agree with the president's policies felt it more prudent to exert their political influence after Obregón had chosen his successor, not before. Naturally, the reason for much of the political agitation over Obregón's successor was rooted in the nature of the president's policies. Throughout his administration, Obregón implemented policies that were designed to broaden the political base of support for the central government

beyond the military. ²¹ Thus, under Obregón's presidency, both the labor and agrarian sectors were organized into political parties, such as the Partido Nacional Laborista (PNL), the Partido Nacional Cooperatista (PNC), and the Partido Nacional Agrarista (PNA). At the same time, many workers were organized into unions, such as the powerful Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana (CROM) led by Luis Morones. It was these organized groups that formed Obregón's principal Dase of support in congress and backed his wide-ranging reform measures in both labor and agriculture. ²²

Besides building civilian support, Obregón instituted several military reforms that focused on limiting the autonomy of the revolutionary generals, reducing the size of the military, and restricting officers to purely military functions. These policies naturally alienated many elements within the military who refused to accept Obregón's authority, and it was this military faction, along with discontented labor unions excluded from the CROM, opposition members of congress, and hacendados affected by the agrarian reforms, who formed the primary source of opposition to

²¹Lieuwen, Mexican Militarism, p. 57.

²²Robert E. Scott, <u>Mexican Government in Transition</u> (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964), pp. 119-120.

²³Lieuwen, <u>Mexican Militarism</u>, pp. 67-72.

Obregón's policies.²⁴ When it became clear that Obregón would support General Plutarco Elías Calles for the presidency, an ally who could be expected to continue Obregón's social and economic reforms, the political opposition turned into a full-scale rebellion.

Initially, Obregón did little beyond mobilizing those armies whom he felt certain would remain loyal. This strategy allowed all military officers of questionable loyalty sufficient opportunity to join the rebels. In this way, Obregón sought to identify those generals who would not submit to the national government. The national government is at least two cases, revolutionary generals who had been forced into retirement as part of Obregón's military reforms joined the rebellion in an attempt to regain lost political power. Beyond the large size of the rebel army that defected, the rebels recruited some 30,000 landholders throughout the country, bringing the total rebel force to approximately 56,000 men. In contrast, the government could initially only gather a force of approximately 44,500 men. Thus, despite the disunity often displayed by the rebel forces, the sheer size

²⁴ Ibid., p. 73, and Randall Hansis, "The Political Strategy of Military Reform: Alvaro Obregón and Revolutionary Mexico, 1920-1924," The Americas, Vol. 36, No. 2 (October, 1979), pp. 216.

²⁵Hansis, "The Political Strategy of Military Reform," pp. 227-228.

²⁶Ibid., p. 230.

²⁷Roberto Quiros Martínez, <u>Alvaro Obregón, Su Vida y Su</u> <u>Obra</u> (Mexico, D.F., 1928), p. 197.

of the rebellion made this a very serious matter. However, the broad political support that Obregón had worked for now served him well, as volunteers contributed by the Partido Laborista and the Partido Agrarista rapidly reinforced Obregón's forces. 28 As Martin Needler writes,

. . . organized <u>ejidatarios</u> cut [rebel leader] Estrada's communication lines, sabotaged his supplies, and even formed diminutive armies which attacked his rear. It soon became clear that Estrada's army was not going to be able to "hold" rural areas at all; then President Obregón marshalled a new army out of a few detachments of troops that had remained loyal, volunteers from the <u>ejidos</u>, and "labor battalions" of Mexico City union members, took to the field and defeated Estrada, who by then had virtually to fight two fronts, against Obregón, and against the ejidatarios harassing his rear. For this result, Mexico had to thank the labor battalions and especially the organized peasants. So labor and the ejidatarios gave substance to their claim for an equal voice with the military in the councils of the Revolution.²⁹

In the end, Obregón's forces prevailed, and Calles was elected president. For the first time since the Mexican Revolution began in 1910, a major military rebelli n was not successful in overthrowing the government and determining the outcome of the presidential succession. Also, organized and well-armed labor and agrarian organizations now had a substantial political voice in the government, which necessarily hampered the political influence once enjoyed exclusively by the revolutionary generals. From now on,

²⁸John W. F. Dulles, <u>Yesterday in Mexico: A Chronicle of the Revolution</u>, 1919-1936 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1961), pp. 229-230.

²⁹Martin C. Needler, "The Political Development of Mexico," <u>American Political Science Review</u>, Vol. 55, No. 2 (June, 1961), p. 310.

these generals had a choice between accepting the widening political base and the dissolution of their political influence, or taking military action to prevent such an occurrence and risking ultimate defeat. For the first time, the risk of rebelling with military force became greater than the risk of remaining loyal to the government; while the rebellion eliminated 102 disloyal generals through battle, execution, or exile, Obregón created fifty-four new generals and promoted thirty-three existing generals to a higher command. 30 Lastly, while their political influence may have decreased relative to past years, it is critical to note that many of the revolutionary generals who remained loyal still enjoyed an immense amount of political influence, simply by virtue of their role as defenders of the established government. At this point, it was only the more conservative elements within the military, those who tended to oppose any of the reforms promised by the Revolution, who were being eliminated through the 1923 and 1927 rebellions.

The presidential succession of 1928, like the previous two, was also associated with a military rebellion. In this instance, Obregón decided that Mexico's interest, as well as his own, would best be served by succeeding Calles as president. At this point, the political influence of the military was still significant, for Calles feared that if he

³⁰ Ernest Gruening, Mexico and its Heritage, p. 322.

did not support Obregón's nomination as well as an amendment to reverse the "No Re-election" clause of the 1917

Constitution, the majority of the military would rise up in support of Obregón. Obregón also had the official backing of organized labor and agrarian groups, whose support for Obregón had proved decisive in the 1923 rebellion.

Nevertheless, Generals Arnulfo Gómez and Francisco R.

Serrano each felt that they were more deserving of the presidency, and began to plot against Obregón and Calles.

Perhaps the most remarkable development concerning the 1927 rebellion was that both generals initially attempted to develop a legal political campaign with the backing of genuine, if not significant, political parties. Gómez had the backing of the newly resurrected Partido
Antirreeleccionista that once supported Madero, while Serrano's supporters formed the Partido Nacional Revolucionario. Also, to be eligible for the presidency, both Gómez and Serrano were required by law to take leave for six months, a move which limited their command over military forces. 32 Although the two candidates must have realized the control Obregón had over the electoral process, it is interesting that both generals initially attempted to work within the established political boundaries.

Nevertheless, with the government and the labor and agrarian

³¹Dulles, <u>Yesterday in Mexico</u>, p. 334.

³² Lieuwen, Mexican Military, p. 97.

groups aligned against them, Gómez and Serrano eventually felt that had no chance of winning without resorting to violence.

The rebellion itself was poorly organized and much smaller in comparison to the rebellions of 1920 and 1923. Only twenty-eight generals and 20 percent of the troops joined the rebellion, and after early and decisive government victories, as well as firm disciplinary actions against the rebel leaders, the rebellion quickly faltered. 33 Agrarian reserves were also mobilized to handle a few local uprisings, but because the great majority of the military remained loyal to the government, they were not really needed. 34 Within a month, the rebellion was over, and all disloyal generals were removed through either execution or exile. To a greater extent than previously witnessed in the rebellion of 1923, the current rebellion showed the futility of employing military force to install a new president.

Obregón was easily elected president in April of 1928, but before he could assume the presidency, he was assassinated by a religious fanatic. There existed a great deal of confusion over who would become the next

³³Dulles, <u>Yesterday in Mexico</u>, pp. 342-354.

³⁴ Lieuwen, <u>Mexican Military</u>, p. 99.

³⁵Other theories on the assassination of Obregón implicate Luis N. Morones, leader of the CROM, and Calles himself. The official version, however, is that the assassin was following the wishes of Cristero sympathizers, who blamed Obregón and Calles for persecuting Catholics. See Dulles, <u>Yesterday in Mexico</u>, pp. 362-378.

president, and the potential for violence was considerable. To avoid the use of military force to decide the presidency, Calles outlined his plans in a speech to Congress for the creation of a political system that would renounce its dependence on the military strongman (caudillo) in exchange for a formalized system of political institutions and laws. 36 Nevertheless, Calles could not dismiss the political influence still retained by some of the most prominent revolutionary generals. In September of 1928, Calles met with the top thirty ranking generals to insure agreement on the choice of a provisional president to replace Obregón. 37 In this meeting, Calles stressed the importance that no army officer become president, and that Congress and the military should agree on the selection prior to any formal announcement. An agreement was soon reached, and with the selection of Emilio Portes Gil as provisional president, the immediate succession crisis was over. Still, the larger question of who would determine future presidential successions remained unanswered.

Three months after Calles announced his desire to establish a formal method of presidential succession, he founded the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR). 38 The

³⁶Lieuwen, <u>Mexican Military</u>, p. 100.

³⁷ Dulles, <u>Yesterday in Mexico</u>, pp. 389-390.

³⁸This party is not to be confused with the Partido Nacional Revolucionario that supported General Serrano's campaign for presidency in 1927.

first PNR convention met in March of 1929 to select a candidate for president, and was made up of delegates from the three principal interest groups of the Revolution: labor, agrarian, and military. Because of factional differences and poor organization among the labor and agrarian groups, the military dominated the convention. key generals at the convention were Juan Andreu Almazán, Joaquín Amaro, Lázaro Cárdenas, and Saturnino Cedillo. Together, they prevented Calles from imposing his personal choice of Aarón Sáenz, ironically another revolutionary general, on the grounds that he was too conservative. 39 Although the PNR was dominated by the military, its mere existence was crucial in formally acknowledging the potential power of agrarian and labor interest groups. as crucial, it was an important first step at establishing a formal code of political succession, putting an end to battlefield contests for the presidency, and eliminating the need to maintain oneself in power through force. 40 In sum, the creation of the PNR would have an enormous effect on limiting the political influence of the military, regardless of whether they remained loyal to the government or not.

Despite the creation of the PNR, however, there were many revolutionary generals who did not wish to accept any curtailment of their political influence. As their

³⁹ Lieuwen, Mexican Military, pp. 102-103

⁴⁰Ibid., pp. 102.

displeasure with the political developments became public, Calles and his supporters sought to isolate them by excluding them as delegates to the PNR convention. rebellion that followed, although sizeable, suffered from poor leadership and coordination, and found little support among the public or the military. 41 As in previous rebellions, the federal troops were supported by agrarian and labor militias who harassed the rebels and prevented them from establishing querilla bases in the countryside. In San Luis Potosí, General Cedillo raised a division of 5,000 agrarians, while the governor of Veracruz mobilized over a thousand peasants to route the rebellion there. 42 As a further sign of the generals' waning political influence, other political opponents of the government, such as José Vasconcelos and the Communist National Worker and Peasant Bloc, refused to join the revolt and publicly denounced it. 43 Perhaps most significant of all was the failure of many army subordinate commanders to follow their generals into rebellion, as General Jesús M. Aquirre discovered in his aborted rebellion in Veracruz. 44 Obviously, without the

⁴¹Dulles, <u>Yesterday in Mexico</u>, pp. 436-458, and Lieuwen, Mexican Militarism, p 99.

⁴²Dulles, <u>Yesterday in Mexico</u>, pp. 442 and 445.

⁴³Ibid., pp. 439-440.

⁴⁴ Ibid., pp. 444-445. As early as 1928, graduates of the newly created military academy were being assigned to regiments of doubtful loyalty in order to weaken the control the revolutionary generals had over their armies. This entire training process is explored in detail in Chapter 4.

loyalty of their armies, the revolutionary generals, whose political clout had always depended on their ability to use military force, would be able to exert little political influence.

Like past rebellions, the 1929 rebellion proved that the use of military force was not a viable option for those generals who refused to accept the participation of other interest groups in the political process, or abide by the formal political boundaries now established for electing future presidents. As the generals who took part in the rebellion discovered, those who were unwilling to accept the new political boundaries would be eliminated.

Significantly, the rebellion of 1929 marked the last time that the military would ever pose a serious threat in using

The election of Lázaro Cárdenas to the presidency was one of the most peaceful campaigns in Mexico's history, a sure sign that the process of presidential succession was becoming institutionalized. To a greater degree than Calles or Obregón, Cárdenas made great efforts to unite the various labor and peasant organizations into powerful political blocs, and encouraged urban labor to organize and demand the rights guaranteed them in the Constitution of 1917.45

force to decide the presidential succession.

Cárdenas also implemented a program of sweeping social and

⁴⁵Lyle C. Brown, "Cárdenas: Creating a Campesino Power Base for Presidential Policy," in <u>Essays on the Mexican</u> Revolution, eds. Wolfskill and Richmond, pp. 107-129.

economic reforms, most noted for its redistribution of nearly 18 million hectares of land into communal ejidos. This figure is well over twice the amount distributed by all of Cárdenas' predecessors combined since the program's initiation under Carranza. 46 Also, to counteract the military power of the Army, Cárdenas organized the peasants into rural reserves and supported the formation of an independent labor militia. 47 Like his two immediate predecessors, Cárdenas took these measures to create a source of political support that was not dependant on the military. However, Cárdenas sought to limit the political influence of the military even further. While the measures taken by Calles and Obregón limited the military's political influence to a certain degree, essentially, all they did was rechannel the political influence of the military from the battlefield into the political arena.

In December 1937, after seventeen years of effort by Mexico's presidents to reduce the political influence of the military, Cárdenas delivered the most damaging blow yet by reorganizing the PNR. Since its inception in 1929 under Calles, the official party had been a mixture of local political machines and various agrarian, labor, and other

⁴⁶ James W. Wilkie, <u>The Mexican Revolution: Federal Expenditure and Social Change Since 1910</u> (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), p. 188.

⁴⁷Albert L. Michaels, "Mexican Politics and Nationalism From Calles to Cárdenas" (Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1966), pp. 201-205.

interest groups that were organized by region and tightly controlled by the military. However, Cárdenas wanted to force the political activities of the military out into the open, and, at the same time, decrease their monopoly on power within the PNR. Therefore, Cárdenas transformed the PNR into the Partido de la Revolución Mexicana (PRM), organizing the new party on a functional, or occupational concept, as opposed to the old, geographical and individual membership structure of the PNR.48 The four new groups that made up the PRM were the labor, agrarian, military, and popular sectors. Each sector received an equal number of party representatives and would collectively decide which among them would fill certain public offices. The actual nominating process was then turned over to the designating sector, and once this sector announced its nominations, all four sectors pledged to support the candidate at the polls. 49 Because each sector was given an equal number of party representatives, the army could now be outvoted by the other sectors.

Critics of Cárdenas accused him of deliberately bringing the military into politics by openly including them as an official sector in the party. Cárdenas responded by saying, "We did not put the army in politics. It was already there. In fact, it had been dominating the situation, and we did

⁴⁸Frank Brandenburg, <u>The Making of Modern Mexico</u>, p. 91.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 91.

well to reduce its influence to one out of four."⁵⁰ In truth, the participation of the military in the PRM carried many restrictions which ensured executive control over the military delegates. First, military officers who commanded troops were not eligible to serve as delegates.⁵¹ Second, Cárdenas controlled the selection of military delegates through his Defense Minister, Manuel Avila Camacho, who had the authority to select each delegate.⁵² Third, military delegates were excluded from nominating or participating in state and local-level elections.⁵³ Finally, Cárdenas encouraged the younger officers to join the popular, labor, and agrarian sectors, so that ambitious generals, who might wish to revolt against the growing power of the labor and agrarian groups, would be faced with the possibility of fighting against their own men.⁵⁴

In 1938, the last military rebellion occurred when General Cedillo, seeing the threat to the military from the other sectors in the PRM, led his private army in a

⁵⁰William C. Townsend, <u>Lázaro Cárdenas, Mexican</u>
<u>Democrat</u> (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1952), p. 216.

⁵¹Alicia Hernández Chávez, <u>Historia de la revolución</u> mexicana, período 1934 a 1940: la mecánica cardenista (México, D.F.: El Colegio de México, 1970), p. 109.

⁵²Lieuwen, <u>Mexican Militarism</u>, p. 125.

⁵³Gordon C. Schloming, "Civil-Military Relations in Mexico, 1910-1940: A Case Study" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1974), p. 306.

⁵⁴Lieuwen, <u>Mexican Militarism</u>, p. 126.

rebellion against Cárdenas. Within a few weeks, the rebellion was crushed. Continuing the well-established pattern of military opposition to the growing power of the central government, the final military challenge occurred during the 1940 presidential election. The year prior to the election had witnessed the political rise of an aggressive labor movement, strongly supported by Cárdenas, that continually clashed with the military for control in the PRM and influence in the Cárdenas administration. The election, then, was viewed as a contest to decide the political future of the revolutionary generals.

In 1939, the PRM met to determine who would be the president's successor. With Cárdenas' direction, the PRM selected Defense Minister General Avila Camacho as the official candidate. However, the majority of the military did not support Avila Camacho, because they did not consider him a general of the Revolution. Avila Camacho had served in the Revolution as a major, thus his rank was not earned on the battlefield, but was considered a gift from Obregón for his loyalty during the 1923 rebellion. SG General Almazán, the highest-ranking officer in the army, telt he should have received the homination from the PRM, and decided to campaign under the Partido Revolucionario de Unificación Nacional (PRUN). He was openly supported by

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 127-129, and Michaels, "Mexican Politics and Nationalism From Calles to Cardenas," pp. 203-207.

⁵⁶Lieuwen, Mexican Militarism, p. 132.

thirty-four generals who took leave to campaign for him, and was backed by most of the military. 57 While Cardenas did not fear that the PRM would lose the election, he did fear that Almazán would lead a rebellion.

On election day, there was considerable movement of troops throughout the principal cities of Mexico, and rioting took place at many polling stations. In Mexico City, there were twenty-seven casualties, most of them supporters of Almazán who were shot by armed workers and peasants. Six days later, the government announced that Avila Camacho had overwhelmingly defeated Almazán in the election. Despite rumors of a rebellion, nothing materialized.

Given the previous discussion of presidential successions in Mexico, the fact that Avila Camacho became president without military support and without having to put down a military rebellion stands out as a significant accomplishment. As previously discussed, during the years 1910-1920, the revolutionary armies used force to decide presidential successions. Between the years 1920 and 1940, various factions within the military also attempted to use force to decide presidential successions, but, unlike past years, were not successful. Now, in 1940, with labor and

⁵⁷Ibid., pp. 134-135.

⁵⁸ Edwin Lieuwen, "Depoliticization of the Mexican Revolutionary Army, 1915-1940," in <u>The Modern Mexican Military: A Reassessment</u>, ed. David Ronteldt (San Diego: University of California, 1984), p. 60.

agrarian organizations exercising a much greater role in politics, the military was forced to accept a president that the majority of the officers did not support. In what proved to be a difficult and lengthy process, the political influence of the military, while not completely broken, had been greatly reduced.

The Military in Government

Like the ability to decide presidential successions, another indicator of the military's political influence is the number and percentage of officers who have held political offices within the Mexican government. Table 5 indicates that within the years 1914-1940, there was an overall decline in the percentage of officers who occupied political offices within the various administrations. As expected, these data support the previous discussion concerning the decline of the military's political influence.

While Table 5 indicates a declining trend for military officeholders in general, Tables 6 and 7 focus specifically on the number of military officers who have served in cabinet positions and as governors. With certain notable exceptions, Table 6 also supports the declining trend in military officeholding. The most notable exception is Carranza's cabinet. Significantly, Carranza never accepted a military rank and campaigned openly against militarismo. It is quite possible that Carranza, sensing the political influence of

the very generals who put him in the presidency, purposely staffed his cabinet with civilians to reduce competition for political power. From de la Huerta to Portes Gil, the percentage of military officers in the cabinet continued to decline until the Ortiz Rubio administration. Ortiz Rubio was the weakest of the three presidents who served during the maximato, ⁵⁹ and the high number of military officers may reflect Calles' increasingly conservative politics during this period. Nevertheless, with the start of Rodríguez's administration, the percentage began to fall once again.

Table 5
Mexican Military Officeholders, 1914-1940

Years	President	Percent Military
1914-192	Carranza	46
1920	de la Huerta	35
1920-192	Obregón	40
1924-192	Calles	3 4
1928-193	Portes Gil	29
1930-193	Ortiz Rubio	32
1932-193	Rodríguez	33
1935	Cárdenas	24
1935-194	Cárdenas	27

Source: Camp, Generals in the Palacio, p. 67.

⁵⁹The maximato refers to the years 1929-1934, the period following Calles' official presidential term, in which Calles continued to exercise supreme political control of the government. On the weakness of Ortiz Rubio, see Schloming, "Civil-Military Relations in Mexico, 1910-1940: A Case Study," pp. 262-265.

<u>Table 6</u>
Military Officers in Cabinet Positions, 1917-1940

Date	President	Civili	an Military	Total	% Military
1917	Carranza	9	2	11	18%
1920	de la Huerta	2	6	11	75%
1920	Obregón	4	5	9	56%
1924	Calles	6	2	8	25%
1928	Portes Gil	9	1	10	10%
1930	Ortiz Rubio	5	4	9	44%
1932	Rodríguez	7	3	10	30%
1934	Cárdenas	9	3	12	25%
1940	Avila Camach	0 10	3	13	23%

Source: Boils, <u>Los Militares y La Política en México</u>, pp. 175-182.

In comparison to Tables 5 and 6, the data in Table 7 are less indicative of the military's declining political influence. In general, the number of military governors declines steadily from 1917-1926. There is an overall increase during the years 1927-1935, but the real increase in military governors occurs during the years of the Cárdenas administration, when the political influence of the military should be at its weakest. Although it may seem difficult to resolve the rise in military governors with a loss of the military's political influence, it must be remembered that the institutionalization of the political process during the Cárdenas era gave the office of president an immense degree of political control that was not evident

<u>Table 7</u>
Military Officers as State Governors, 1917-1940

<u>Year</u>	Military	Civilian	Percent Military
1917 1918	24 19	7 12	77 61
1919	18	13	58
		19	39
1920	12		
1921	12	19	39
1922	11	20	35
1923	11	20	35
1924	11	20	35
1925	10	21	32
1926	9	22	29
1927	12	19	39
1928	14	17	45
1929	12	19	39
1930	12	19	39
1931	10	21	32
1932	12	19	39
1933	15	16	48
1934	14	17	45
1935	14	17	45
1936	18	13	58
1937	20	11	65
1938	22	9	71
1939	22	9	71
1940	20	11	65

Source: Camp, <u>Mexican Political Biographies</u>, pp. 428-445, and Hernández Chávez, <u>Historia de</u> la revolución mexicana, Anexo 2.

under previous administrations. 60 This immense political power, in turn, may have made him more secure in the

⁶⁰Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, "Civil-Military Relations in Mexico," in <u>The Military and Democracy, The Future of Civil-Military Relations in Latin America</u>, eds. Louis W. Goodman, Johanna S.R. Mendelson, and Juan Rial (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990), p. 221, and Schloming, "Civil-Military Relations in Mexico, 1910-1940: A Case Study," pp. 286-290.

acceptance of military officers serving as governors. It is also possible that Cárdenas was simply using the governorships to placate or reward military officers who were losing independent strength elsewhere.

Another crucial point is that Cárdenas was careful to ensure that only trusted and loyal governors stayed in power; those governors, military or civilian, who Cárdenas felt he could not trust were immediately removed from office. In at least one documented example, Cárdenas removed General Carlos Real, the governor of Durango, because of his loyalty to Calles. His replacement, however, was another military officer, General Severino Ceniceros, and not a civilian. Thus, it appears that, for Cárdenas, political loyalty was more important than the presence of military rank.

The Military Budget

Another method of assessing the political influence of the military is to examine the percentage of the national budget allotted to the armed forces. As Table 8 clearly shows, during the first year of the Carranza administration, the actual percentage of funds spent on the military was a

⁶¹ Townsend, <u>Lázaro Cárdenas</u>, <u>Mexican Democrat</u>, pp. 114-116.

⁶²Roderic A. Camp, <u>Mexican Political Biographies</u>, 1884-1934 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1991), pp. 181-182.

striking 69.6 percent of the national budget. However, there is a noticeable and steady decline in the military budget, as shown by the year 1940, when military expenditures were a relatively small 19.7 percent. Because of the large growth in the national budget, it was often possible during certain years for the Mexican government to both increase the military budget in actual dollars, yet decrease the military's percentage of the budget.

Nevertheless, the fact remains that, in relative terms, the military was continuously denied a share of the government's growing resources, an excellent indicator of the military's declining political influence.

TABLE 8
Military Budget, 1917-1940
(Figures in Millions of Pesos, Base Year = 1950)

<u>Year</u>	President	Total <u>Budget</u>	Military <u>Budget</u>	Military <u>Budget (%)</u>
1917	Carranza			69.6
1918	Carranza	253	140	55.5
1919	Carranza	171	81	47.4
1920	Carranza	364	176	48.4
1921	Obregón	684	363	53.0
1922	Obregón	820	380	46.4
1923	Obregón	790	265	33.6
1924	Obregón	970	413	42.6
1925	Calles	1007	311	30.9
1926	Calles	1105	329	29.8
1927	Calles	1080	345	31.9
1928	Calles	1043	337	32.3
1929	Portes Gil	1002	374	37.3
1930	Gil/Ortiz Rubio	997	308	30.9

TABLE 8--Continued

<u>Year</u>	President	Total <u>Budget</u>	Military <u>Budget</u>	Military Budget (%)
1931	Ortiz Rubio	917	274	29.9
1932	Ortiz Rubio	941	271	28.8
1933	Rodríguez	1029	253	24.6
1934	Rodríguez	1072	243	22.7
1935	Cárdenas	1208	252	20.9
1936	Cárdenas	1538	266	17.3
1937	Cárdenas	1530	266	17.4
1938	Cárdenas	1541	257	16.7
1939	Cárdenas	1733	274	15.8
1940	Cárdenas	1786	352	19.7

Source: Compiled from data in Wilkie, <u>The Mexican</u>
<u>Revolution</u>, pp. 22, and 102-103.

Military Strength

Another indicator of military political influence is the size of the military forces, outlined in Table 9. As so often seen in the past, a sizeable military force can always serve to threaten or actually enforce the implementation of certain political policies. This was clearly seen in the various rebellions that occurred in Mexico throughout the 1920's. As Table 9 indicates, there is a fairly steady and sizeable decline in the size of the military forces during the years 1917-1940. Perhaps less surprising is the relatively small decrease in the number of generals and senior officers when compared to the decrease in the number of troops. Obviously, it was much easier for the Mexican government to decrease troop strength than the number of high-ranking officers. Nevertheless, it is clear that these

same officers were unable to prevent a considerable decrease in military strength, which in past years often served as the most effective way of exerting political influence.

Table 9
Military Strength, 1917-1940

	_	Senior	Junior			_
<u>Year</u>	Generals	Officers	Officers	Troops	Horses	Mules
1917	207	2,638	18,452	125,823		
1919	281	2,976	12,493	119,393	59,722	7,808
1920	500	3,379	14,818	98,623	45,315	5,265
1921	318	3,370	10,771	68,320	36,482	
1923	514	2,855	8,842	61,792	29,735	5,712
1924	439	2,297	6,846	73,153	20,153	5,405
1925	459	2,297	6,846	53,345	27,341	4,999
1926	398	2,180	6,197	44,243	22,134	5,588
1927	413	1,955	6,079	60,281	30,616	5,671
1928	392	1,913	6,702	64,079	34,442	6,188
1929	373	1,614	5,443	52,235		
1930	426	2,444	6,679	63,007	27,604	5,637
1933	398	2,176	6,143	41,014	19,859	4,294
1935	394	2,217	6,448	39,979		
1937	350	2,535	6,368	50,342		
1938	354		4,469	49,000		
1940	***	2,000	4,000	48,647		

Source: Compiled from data in Lozoya, <u>El Ejército</u>
<u>Mexicano</u>, p. 156; <u>Newsweek</u>, October 14, 1940, p.
41; Secretaría de Gobernación, <u>Seis Años de</u>
<u>Gobierno al Servicio de México</u>, p. 90; Secretaría
de Guerra y Marina, <u>Memoria</u>, pp. 38-39; Lieuwen,
<u>Mexican Militarism</u>, p. 68; Michaels, "Mexican
Politics and Nationalism from Calles to
Cárdenas," p. 190; Hernández Chávez, <u>Historia de la</u>
<u>revolución mexicana</u>, p. 80; and León Toral, <u>El</u>
<u>ejército mexicano</u>, pp. 468 and 485.

What is even more remarkable is that as the generals were watching their troop strength decline, they were also witnessing the creation of armed labor and agrarian militias that far outnumbered the regular forces. 63 Cárdenas especially sought to organize and manipulate these militias to counter the strength of the military. Finally, the drop in military strength is underscored by the rapidly rising population, which saw the Mexican population jump from 14 million to nearly 20 million between the years 1920 and 1940.64

Military Zones

Given the high degree of <u>personalismo</u>, or loyalty to an individual leader, that has typically characterized Mexican politics, it is understandable that the numerous military zone commanders in Mexico have traditionally exercised a high level of political influence. During and after the years of the Mexican Revolution, this political influence was largely independent of the central government in Mexico City, and was directly proportional to the large number of troops whose loyalty was first and foremost to their commander. Thus, there was a direct correlation between the

⁶³Agrarian Reserves and Labor Militias numbered over 100,000 members each. See R.L. Martin, "Mexico to Create Big Reserve Army," New York Times, July 18, 1935, p. 7, and Frank L. Kluckhohn, "Cárdenas Reviews Worker's Army of 100,000; Mexican Proletarians Get Uniforms and Arms," New York Times, May 2, 1938, p. 2.

⁶⁴Wilkie, The Mexican Revolution, p. 24.

number of existing military zones and the degree of military power and political influence possessed by the zone commanders; the greater the number of military zones, the less territory the commanders could control, and the smaller the number of troops under their command. Also, a greater number of zone commanders meant that there would be more potential rivals for each commander to contend with in his desire to influence the political system.

Figure 1 shows the number of military zones in 1913. At this stage, Mexico consisted of three military commands and 10 military zones. While Figure 1 refers to the territorial division as it applied to Huerta's Federal Army, it gives us an idea of how the territorial division appeared in 1919, when Carranza's Constitutionalist Army consisted of 14 military zones. In that same year, Carranza again divided Mexico into twenty-three military zones. 65 Finally, in 1924, Calles increased the number of military zones to thirty-three in order to reduce the size of the regional military commands, and therefore limit the ability of the military zone commanders to threaten the government. 66 Figure 2 shows how these zones existed in the year 1937. Just as important as the increase in military zones, the government also began a policy of rotating the zone

⁵Jesús de León Toral, <u>El ejército mexicano</u> (Mexico City: Secretaría de Defensa Nacional, 1979), pp. 434-435.

⁶⁶Virginia Prewett, "The Mexican Army," <u>Foreign Affairs</u>, Vol. 19, No. 3 (April, 1941), p. 613.

commanders among the various military zones at regular intervals. By doing this, the government could prevent any one general from establishing personal influence over too large a sector of the military.⁶⁷



Figure 1. MILITARY ZONES - 1913

Source: León Toral, El ejército mexicano, p. 366

⁶⁷Ibid.




Figure 2. MILITARY ZONES - 1937

Source: Hernández Chávez, <u>Historia de la revolución mexicana</u>, p. 98

Conclusion

As we have seen, the political influence of the Mexican military steadily declined during the years 1917-1940. number of indicators demonstrate this declining trend in the military's political influence. Given the previous role of the revolutionary forces during the years 1910-1917, the greatest indicator of the revolutionary generals' political influence was their ability to influence the process of presidential succession. A close examination of this process clearly shows that while the military did not completely lose its ability to influence politics, it certainly lost its role as the sole arbiter of presidential successions. Other indicators of political influence, such as the number of military officers serving in political positions, the size of the military budget, the size of military troop strength, and the number of military zones, all provide solid evidence that, in relative terms, the military lost a great degree of political influence during this era.

While Chapter 2 examined the current theory of the relationship between political influence and military professionalization, and this chapter documented the decline of the Mexican military's political influence, two key questions remain: what is the nature of the professionalization process that the Mexican military underwent, and what is the relationship between this process and the military's declining political influence? Because

the second question cannot be answered without examining the first, we must now turn our attention to the professionalization of the Mexican military during the years 1917-1940.

CHAPTER 4

PROFESSIONALIZATION OF THE MEXICAN MILITARY

Introduction

As stated in the previous chapter, the victorious armies of the revolutionary forces that defeated first Díaz and then Huerta could hardly be classified as a cohesive military institution. Even with the formation and success of Carranza's Constitutionalist Army, many of his top generals, particularly those serving as governors or military-zone commanders, continued to exercise a great deal of independent political and military power. 1 Even more troublesome for Carranza were those military forces that failed to join his Constitutionalist Army altogether. Despite Villa's defeat by Obregón in 1915, he continued to harass Carranza in the northern states of Chihuahua and Durango. Meanwhile, much of the territory in Morelos, Michoacán, and Guerrero remained under the control of the zapatistas. Thus, for Carranza and those who would succeed him as president, much of the effort to professionalize the Mexican military focused on integrating these regional and independent armies into a cohesive institution that would submit to the authority of the national government. As we

¹Edwin Lieuwen, <u>Mexican Militarism: The Political Rise</u> and Fall of the Revolutionary Army, 1910-1940 (Albuquerque: The University of New Mexico Press, 1968), pp. 36-37.

shall see, the initial attempts at professionalization necessarily concentrated on a basic strategy of military reorganization and modernization that sought to create the existence of a single national army. Gradually, however, the professionalization process evolved into a formal system of training and education that put heavy emphasis on discipline and loyalty to the principles of the Revolution.² By 1940, Mexico's leaders successfully used military professionalization to equate loyalty to the ideals of the Revolution with loyalty to the national government.

The Carranza Years, 1917-1920

Although the Constitutionalist Army had given Carranza the military might to defeat his rivals for the leadership of Mexico, Carranza soon realized that the structure of the revolutionary forces as they existed in 1916 was no longer appropriate if he were to exercise sufficient authority over them. Thus, Carranza's initial strategy both prior to, and during, his years as president focused on restructuring the army and providing it with a greater sense of organization. Although Carranza did not officially become president of

²Although the social, economic, and political success of the Mexican Revolution is constantly debated, there is little argument that, apart from any tangible results, the goals and ideals of the Revolution have always been presented as an ongoing struggle associated with improving the social position of the Mexican populace, and eliminating any political remnants associated with the dictatorial government of Díaz. See Moisés González Navarro, "La Ideología de la Revolución," in <u>Misteria Mexicana</u>, Vol. 10, No. 4 (April-June, 1961), pp. 628-636.

Mexico until May 1, 1917, he began to reorganize the Constitutionalist Army prior to this date. During this period, Carranza was greatly aided by Obregón, who served as Secretary of War from March 14, 1916 to May 1, 1917. To gain greater control of the diverse military forces, Obregón created a General Staff system, the Departamento del Estado Mayor, that theoretically brought under its control all military officers who had both direct and indirect command over troops. While many revolutionary generals undoubtedly ignored or resisted this attempt at limiting their autonomy, at the very least, an official chain of command structure that gave formal recognition to the authority of the Mexican government was now in place.

In another organizational change, Obregón reorganized the Departamento de Artillería, which now supervised the newly created Departamento de Establacimientos Fabriles y Aprovisionamientos Militares. This department directed the creation of the Fábrica Nacional de Armas, and oversaw the reopening of La Fábrica Nacional de Pólvora and the Maestranza Nacional de Artillería, all of which were dedicated to the manufacture and repair of war materials. Obregón also created the Escuela Elemental de Artillería, whose functions included instruction in equipment

³Lieuwen, <u>Mexican Militarism</u>, p. 47, and Jesús de León Toral, <u>El ejército mexicano</u> (Mexico City: Secretaría de Defensa Nacional, 1979), p. 424.

⁴León Toral, <u>El ejército mexicano</u>, p. 425.

maintenance, artillery firing, and battle organization and maneuvers.⁵ In addition, with the creation of the <u>Agencia</u> <u>General de Compras</u> and the <u>Almacenes Generales de</u> <u>Artillería</u>, Obregón set up a unified purchasing office for the supply of material to these industries, and arranged for the material to be stored in central warehousing facilities.⁶

The effort by Carranza and Obregón to make Mexico self-sufficient in arms was an important development, for the many diverse and independent armies in Mexico made a steady and reliable source of arms crucial for establishing control in the outer territories. Carranza's experience during the previous years of the Mexican Revolution proved that ammunition deliveries from foreign suppliers were inherently risky, and the absence of such deliveries was often considered to be the deciding factor between victory and defeat. The results of Carranza's ambitious expansion of munitions factories were impressive; in one example, the ammunitions factory at Chapultepec Castle increased its production over a two-year period from three thousand cartridges a day to a capacity of one million per day. 7

⁵Ibid., p. 425.

⁶Ibid., p. 425. and Linda B. Hall, <u>Alvaro Obregón:</u>
<u>Power and Revolution in Mexico, 1911-1920</u> (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1981), p. 157.

⁷Douglas W. Richmond, <u>Venustiano Carranza's Nationalist Struggle</u>, <u>1893-1920</u> (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), p. 159.

Faced with the prospect of fighting a military force that possessed an overwhelming superiority in arms and munitions, many of the revolutionary generals opted to ally themselves with the Constitutionalist Army.⁸

The military's health service was another area that came under Obregón's scrutiny. Obregón organized the military hospitals, clinics, and aid stations into twelve regional centers that reported directly to the War Department. He also ordered the reorganization of the Escuela Médico Militar, which gave the Constitutionalist Army a regular group of trained physicians, and led to the development of new and better techniques for dealing with war wounds.

Perhaps the most important initiative taken by Obregón during his short tenure as Secretary of War was the founding of the Academia del Estado Mayor. The academy officially opened on October 15, 1916 for the purpose of "preparing officers currently serving on the General Staff to carry out their duties with complete commitment." Although the academy did not operate for very long (it was closed on January 1, 1920), it became the precursor to the much more successful Colegio Militar. Beginning with the Academia del Estado Mayor, the academies symbolized the importance that the military and political leaders of Mexico attached to the

⁸Ibid.

⁹Hall, <u>Alvaro Obregón</u>, pp. 157-158, and León Toral, <u>El</u> <u>ejército mexicano</u>, p. 432.

¹⁰ León Toral, <u>El ejército mexicano</u>, pp. 427-428.

creation of a military institution dedicated to upholding the ideals of the Revolution. It was more than a coincidence, of course, that these ideals would be defined by the executive arm of the government. Nevertheless, as we shall see throughout this chapter, a key factor in shaping the military's relationship with the national government would be the conscious decision to associate the mission of the armed forces with defending the ideals of the Revolution. The beginnings of this association are evident in Obregón's inauguration speech at the academy on October 22, 1916, in which he states,

People are pacified with laws, and the laws are defended with rifles. When the Revolution finishes its work of condensing into laws and decrees the institutions for which it has fought and the ideals for which the people have spilled their blood, peace will in fact extend throughout the entire countryside, in spite of the científicos, our enemies, who have served as the henchmen of Díaz.

But these law and decrees, which inevitably must have a social base that favors the exploited and oppressed labor classes, will necessarily harm the private interests that grew up under the protection of immoral governments, and increase the tears and sufferings of our people.

When these laws and decrees are put into effect, they will not fail, much to the detriment of those who seek to violate and demolish them against all the principles of morality and truth. And then, against these attacks and cruel schemes, we will, as we must, be prepared to defend our institutions with arms in hand, to defend the fruits born of the seeds that were sown by the Revolution, and watered by the blood of patriots. 11

¹¹ Narciso Bassols Batalla, <u>El Pensamiento Político de</u> <u>Alvaro Obregón</u> (México, D.F.: Impresiones Modernas, 1967), p. 119.

Obregón's tenure as Secretary of War ended on the day that Carranza officially became president of Mexico, and coincidentally, on the same day that the Constitutionalist Army was renamed the National Army. 12 Nevertheless, the same pattern of expansion and reorganization continued throughout Carranza's term. One of the most notable developments was the establishment of the Mexican Air Force. 13 By 1918, the Mexican Air Force consisted of sixteen operational planes, six spares, and an additional twelve under construction. These planes were constructed at the new factories of the Escuela Militar de Aviación under the direction of a French-trained expert. Carranza also reorganized the Corps of Engineers into five commands, stationed throughout the countryside, for the purpose of repairing military buildings and barracks that were either in poor condition or had been destroyed as a consequence of the fighting associated with the Revolution. 14

By 1919, Carranza realized that the National Army clearly had an excessive number of men, particularly officers. To induce these excess officers to retire, he established the <u>Legión de Honor</u>, which allowed member officers to keep their rank and receive their pay as if they

¹² Lieuwen, Mexican Militarism, p. 47.

¹³Richmond, Venustiano Carranza's Nationalist Struggle,
p. 158.

¹⁴ León Toral, El_ejército mexicano, p.425.

were on active duty. 15 Those officers in excess who refused to join were reviewed by a special agency, the <u>Comisión</u>

<u>Superior Revisora de Hojas de Servicio</u>, which determined whether the officer would stay or be placed in a reserve status at half pay. 16

The last major contribution during Carranza's term was the reopening of the Colegio Militar, which had closed in 1914 after the Constitutionalist Army defeated Huerta. The Colegio Militar was originally founded in 1823 and, in the view of most Mexicans, has enjoyed a proud history of unwavering loyalty to the government. In Mexico, the story of the Niños Héroes serves as an example of the academy's reputation for loyalty and courage. On September 13, 1847, the final battle of Mexico's war with the United States took place at the Colegio Militar in Chapultepec. As the American troops climbed over the fortress-like walls of the school, the last defenders were the cadets, who allegedly fought to their death rather than surrender to the Americans. Also notable were the cadets who remained loyal to Carranza during the 1920 rebellion, with many of

¹⁵Ibid., p. 435, and Lieuwen, Mexican Militarism, p.
46.

¹⁶Lieuwen, <u>Mexican Militarism</u>, p. 46.

¹⁷Salvador Gutiérrez Contreras, <u>La acción heroica de</u>
<u>Juan Escutia en la defensa de Chapultepec y la intervención norteamericana de 1847</u> (Jalisco, Mexico, 1990), pp. 65-33.
This story is still very much a part of Mexico's culture and history. Today, one can find in circulation a 5000 peso bill with a depiction of both the <u>Niños Héroes</u> and the Chapultepec Castle.

the cadets accompanying Carranza as he fled to Veracruz. 18 Given the image of loyalty that the <u>Colegio Militar</u> had built up over the years, Carranza saw the academy as an excellent way of instilling such values as discipline and loyalty into the officers of the National Army.

Under the direction of Generals Francisco L. trquizo and Jacinto B. Treviño, himself a graduate of the <u>Colegio</u>

<u>Militar</u> during the <u>porfiriato</u>, the academy stated its mission as follows:

The <u>Colegic Militar</u> will be an institution that vill have the objective of imparting the necessary education and teaching to military officers who desire to improve their knowledge in the art of war, and instructing the cadets to dedicate themselves to a military career, so that they will be able to enter the military as officers.¹⁹

The academy was open to existing military officers and to cadets who would receive their commission upon graduation, and was organized into the following sections:

Dirección General, Escuela de Infantería, Escuela de

Caballería, Escuela de Administración Militar, Escuela de

Ingenieros Militares, Escuela de Artillería, and Escuela de

Estado Mayor. Courses at the Escuelas de Infantería,

Caballería, and Administración Militar lasted two years

¹⁸ Because of the academy's celebrated loyalty, the word "Heroico" was added to the name <u>Colegio Militar</u> in 1949. See Roderic A. Camp, <u>Generals in the Palacio: The Military in Modern Mexico</u> (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 141.

¹⁹Gabriel Cuevas, El Glorioso Colegio Militar Mexicano en un Siglo (1824-1924) (México, D.F.: Scciedad Mexicana de Publicaciones, 1937), p. 168.

while the remaining schools required five years to graduate. 20

Despite all the efforts by Carranza and Obregon to reorganize the revolutionary forces into a unified army, there were still numerous signs that the name "National Army" was more symbolic than it was real. The villistas and zapatistas still resisted Carranza's attempts to incorporate them into the National Army, and many of the reforms alienated a number of powerful revolutionary generals within the National Army. In reality, these generals viewed their affiliation with the National Army in very tentative terms. In addition, and in spite of all the efforts at centralizing the military's munitions and equipment, the great amounts of different equipment in the army's inventory still caused a large logistical problem; in cannons alone, the National Army was using a wide range of models that required eleven different calibres. 21 Finally, the only recent establishment of the Academia del Estado Mayor had little immediate effect in changing the nature of the National Army, which remained characterized by personalismo, corruption, petty rivalry, extortion, and graft. 22 With the fall of Carranza in 1920, it would be up to Obregón to

²⁰Ibid., pp. 170-176.

²¹ León Toral, <u>El ejército mexicano</u>, p. 434.

²²Randall Hansis, "The Political Strategy of Military Reform: Alvaro Obregón and Revolutionary Mexico, 1920-1924," The Americas, Vol. 36, No. 2 (October, 1979), p. 200.

improve on the small, but important steps taken to professionalize the Mexican military.

The Obregón Years, 1920-1924

Before discussing some of the specific actions that Obregón undertook to professionalize the military, it is important to recognize that Obregón was the most successful general to have participated in the Revolution, and he therefore enjoyed a great deal of personal prestige among the other revolutionary generals.²³ Because they respected Obregón's many battlefield accomplishments, they generally accepted the fact that he had earned the right to occupy the presidency. Although Obregón would certainly encounter many challenges to his efforts at reforming the military, much of his success can be attributed to the great fear and respect that he commanded among military men, an advantage that Carranza was not able to enjoy.²⁴

During his first two years in office, Obregón encountered several conspiracies from military forces that claimed to be followers of such revolutionary leaders as Carranza, Villa, and Pablo González. These armies were led by revolutionary generals who refused to accept Obregón's authority as president, and who resisted the integration of their private armies into the National Army. Throughout

²³Frank Tannenbaum, <u>Mexico: The Struggle for Peace and Bread</u> (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950), p. 63.

²⁴ Ibid.

1921 and 1922, Obregón arrested and executed several carrancista and gonzalista generals before rebel movements could be organized, or more accurately, before conspiracies could in fact be proven. 25 In 1922, a rebellion, led by carrancista general Francisco Murguía, did take place. However, the rebellion found little support and was easily and quickly defeated by the National Army. 26 The most serious military challenge to Obregón's rule was the rebellion that occurred in 1923, previously discussed in Chapter 3. Unlike the past uprisings in 1921 and 1922, the 1923 rebellion was largely a revolt that split the National Army into two opposing factions. Nevertheless, as we have seen, Obregón's forces were triumphant. Having eliminated 102 revolutionary generals and nearly 3000 other disloyal officers from its ranks, the National Army actually emerged from the rebellion with a greater degree of unity.²⁷

Despite Obregón's military success in defeating many of the revolutionary generals who refused to acknowledge his authority, he did not always see force as the best method for winning their loyalty. Some of the worst abuses carried out by the generals stemmed from their use of personal intimidation and arbitrary confiscation to acquire

²⁵Lieuwen, <u>Mexican Militarism</u>, pp. 63-64.

²⁶John W. F. Dulles, <u>Yesterday in Mexico</u>: <u>A Chronicle of the Revolution</u>, 1919-1936 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1961), pp. 115-117.

 $^{^{27}}$ See Table 4 in Chapter 3 for the size of the 1923 rebellion.

properties and goods that belonged to local civilians. Obregón felt that he could prevent these abuses, not through reform, but through the use of "functional graft," a phenomenon in which the national treasury became the sole source of enrichment for the generals. Obregón held the cynical conviction that loyalty often had to be purchased, as reflected in his now famous statement that "there is no general able to resist a cañonazo (cannonade) of fifty thousand pesos."29

The method in which Pancho Villa was pacified under interim president, Adolfo de la Huerta, just prior to Obregón's official election, serves as a clear example of how this "functional graft" operated. 30 Although the military threat posed by Villa had diminished over the years, he was still quite capable of causing trouble for the Mexican government, as his raids into the United States clearly demonstrated. In return for incorporating all but fifty of his seven-hundred man force into the National Army and forsaking further banditry, Villa received a 200,000-acre hacienda on the border between Chihuahua and Durango. Beginning in 1921, until Villa's assassination in 1923, the government paid for such expenses as uniforms for Villa's

²⁸Hansis, "The Political Strategy of Military Reform," p. 207.

²⁹Lieuwen, <u>Mexican Militarism</u>, p. 64

³⁰Ibid., p. 62.

cavalrymen, agricultural equipment, house repairs, and pensions.

Certainly, this controversial policy of encouraging the revolutionary generals to exchange their political autonomy for material gain can hardly be categorized as a step towards professionalization. Nevertheless, Obregón's tactics were consistent with the manner in which the future presidents of Mexico, through control of the political party, would distribute political and economic favors to those who pledged allegiance to the existing government. 31 In attempting to become the sole source of monetary and material favors, Obregón believed that he could control the amount and the recipients of such favors, while hopefully making these recipients indebted to himself and thereby preventing predatory abuses towards local civilians. 32 While Obregón's policy of "functional graft" enjoyed less success than anticipated, given the independent nature of the revolutionary generals serving in the National Army, and the importance of retaining some degree of military unification, there appeared to be few near-term alternatives.

Of course, not all of Obregón's reforms were accomplished through military force or bribery. Continuing

³¹Robert E. Scott, <u>Mexican Government in Transition</u> (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964), pp. 175-176.

³²Hansis, "The Political Strategy of Military Reform,"
p. 207.

the work he had started as Secretary of War under Carranza, Obregón overhauled the old General Staff system, creating in its place the Estado Mayor General del Ejército, which now included departments for the military zones, special military projects, engineers, military education, and administration. He also ordered the creation of a communications corps and a special branch attached to the engineering corps that specialized in explosives. In 1921, Obregón greatly increased the size of the cavalry, making it the largest branch in the National Army. Like past actions aimed at eliminating the independent armies of the revolutionary generals, this policy recognized the importance of the cavalry in maintaining control of those peripheral territories that traditionally resisted the centralizing power of the government. 35

Obregón also created the <u>Departamento de Aviación</u> for the purpose of revitalizing the <u>Escuela Militar de Aviación</u>, which had been operating at a minimal level. 36 The school was now organized so that it could begin training pilots who would then proceed to the <u>Escuela de Vuelo</u> for advanced training. The <u>Departamento de Aviación</u> also assumed direct control of its own repair centers, which had previously been

³³ León Toral, <u>El ejército mexicano</u>, p. 448.

³⁴Ibid., p. 448.

³⁵Lieuwen, <u>Mexican Militarism</u>, pp. 68-69.

³⁶León Toral, <u>El ejército mexicano</u>, pp. 435 and 450.

under control of the <u>Departamento de Artillería</u>. In 1923, Obregón expanded the <u>Departamento de Aviación</u> to include a maintenance section and a section for commercial aviation. 37 As the expansion led to more aircraft, the squadrons were organized into fighters, fighters/light bombers, and heavy bombers.

The Comisión Superior Revisora de Hojas de Servicio, originally created during Carranza's rule, continued its function of removing excess officers from the National Army. 38 For this purpose, officers were put into three categories: those who had proven themselves with command and battle experience and had legally obtained their rank; those who had served effectively, but could not justify their rank and had little command experience; and those who were never truly military officers, but had taken advantage of political connections to obtain their rank. In 1921 and 1922, the commission reduced the National Army by a total of 183 generals, 1,405 colonels and majors, 5,243 captains and lieutenants, and 27,233 troops, with each receiving three months pay. In 1922, the commission further reduced the ranks by putting another 91 generals, 774 colonels and majors, and 1,116 captains and lieutenants into reserve status. Another method of reducing military strength was through the establishment of military agricultural colonies,

³⁷Ibid., p. 452.

³⁸Ibid., pp. 449-451.

which allowed discharged officers and troops to purchase land through government loans. 39

In continuing the high consideration given to military education, Obregón instructed the <u>Colegio Militar</u> to overhaul its academic program by adding new courses and more competent instructors. 40 He also created the <u>Escuela de Clases</u>, designed specifically for the instruction of sergeants, as well as a technical school and two schools for teaching fencing and physical education. 41 In August of 1921, Obregón brought all of the diverse military schools under the supervision of the <u>Colegio Militar</u>, thereby giving the academy control of 107 instructors located in seventy different schools throughout Mexico. 42

Although the <u>Colegio Militar</u> was instrumental in instilling a sense of revolutionary heritage into the military, Obregón took steps to widen the means by which this influence would occur. An important development was the publication of a monthly bulletin called "El Soldado,"

³⁹Lieuwen, <u>Mexican Militarism</u>, p. 67. As one might expect, these reforms were not popular with many military officers, and they led directly to the existence of disgruntled ex-military officers who were quick to join the several military rebellions in 1923, 1927, and 1929. As discussed in Chapter 3, so many officers and enlisted troops joined the rebel side during the 1923 military rebellion that Obregón was nearly overthrown.

⁴⁰Cuevas, El Glorioso Colegio Militar, pp. 190-192.

 $^{^{41}}$ Ibid., p. 188, and León Toral, <u>El ejército mexicano</u>, pp-450-451.

⁴² León Toral, <u>El ejército mexicano</u>, p. 450.

whose purpose was to "familiarize military personnel with the ideology of the Revolution, in addition to providing military news and cultural articles."43 The bulletin was very popular and widely distributed. Besides giving the average soldier a source from which he could learn both his obligations as well as his rights, it also was designed to give all military personnel, from generals to sergeants, a greater feeling that they were part of a cohesive institution. 44 To further the military's association with this revolutionary ideology, an ideology that associated the army's mission with improving the quality of life of Mexican citizens, Obregón created nineteen military work battalions for the purpose of roadbuilding, irrigation development, and railroad and telegraph repair. 45 As we shall see, this mission of civic action would come to play a key role in defining the Mexican military's unique process of professionalization.

From the above discussion, we can see that Obregón made great strides in professionalizing the revolutionary armies of Mexico. Although his methods were often counter to the strict ideals of military professionalization, Obregón was able to eliminate many of the revolutionary generals who refused to become part of the National Army, and took steps

⁴³Ibid., p. 452.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 452-453.

⁴⁵Lieuwen, <u>Mexican Military</u>, p. 72.

to making the National Army itself more of a cohesive institution. Great strides were also made in the area of military education, primarily through the <u>Colegio Militar</u>, which began to provide the military with knowledge of the technical aspects of their mission. More importantly, the military schools, along with the mission of civic action and such publications as "El Soldado," began to instill in the military a unique sense of revolutionary ideology that fostered a sense of duty to uphold and further the goals of the Revolution.

The Calles Years, 1924-1934

Despite the advances made by Obregón in reforming the military, it was obvious from the 1923 rebellion that many factions within the military still refused to submit to the authority of the Mexican government. Like Obregón, Calles realized that there was still a great deal of work to be done to unify the National Army and to further improve the Army's organization, education and training. Although Calles had strong opinions on how the military should be professionalized, he delegated much of this task to his Secretary of War, General Joaquín Amaro. Amaro was seen as a typical product of the Mexican Revolution. From his humble origins as a poor mestizo peasant who entered Madero's revolutionary army as a private, Amaro distinguished himself through several battles and eventually

earned the rank of <u>General de División</u>. ⁴⁶ Throughout his years as Secretary of War, Amaro earned a fierce reputation as a rigid, tough-minded general who was both a strict disciplinarian and a brilliant organizer. ⁴⁷ As Carlton Beals, a correspondent for the <u>New York Times</u> reported,

The day after the last Independence Day parade, I saw Amaro, at the Balbuena Aviation Field, put several generals on the mat for certain remissnesses the previous morning. Those generals were men accustomed to rule, to kill, to fight, to work for their will unhampered, but Amaro cursed them out like flunkies. One has to realize the unruly arrogance and jealousy of the military caste in Mexico to appreciate such an episode and its meaning in terms of personal assurance and control.⁴⁸

Despite the independent nature of the revolutionary generals, and the great amount of work in professionalizing the military that lay ahead, it appears that Amaro's strong character made him uniquely qualified to meet the enormous challenge of professionalizing the National Army.

As in past administrations, Calles and Amaro were forced to contend with military rebellions and generals who refused

⁴⁶Carleton Beals, "The Indian Who Sways Mexico's Destiny, Joaquín Amaro," in Revolution in Mexico: Years of Upheaval, 1910-1940, eds. James W. Wilkie and Albert L. Michaels (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1969), p. 167, and León Toral, El ejército mexicano, p. 470. The rank of General de División is roughly equivalent to a four star general in the United States military. See James D. Rudolph, ed., Mexico, A Country Study, Area Handbook Series (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), p. 360.

⁴⁷Beals, "The Indian Who Sways Mexico's Destiny, Joaquín Amaro," p. 168, and Lieuwen, <u>Mexican Militarism</u>, p. 86.

⁴⁸ Beals, "The Indian Who Sways Mexico's Destiny, Joaquín Amaro," p. 168.

to submit completely to their authority. Like Obregón, Calles and Amaro often resorted to force as well as "functional graft" to pacify many of the generals. 49 Amaro also continued the past trend of reducing the number of troops and the percentage of the national budget reserved for the military. Yet, Amaro did not simply want to reduce the size of the military. His real aim was to reorganize the military so that it would be both a capable military force and an institution committed to furthering the goals of the Revolution. For this purpose, Amaro instructed one of his top generals, General José Alvarez, to organize a conference that would decide the future organization and development of the National Army. 50 In attendance were some of the most important and powerful generals in the National Army, as well as several military attachés from foreign countries. General Alvarez began the conference with a speech in which he discussed the weaknesses of the Federal Army under Díaz, the development and nature of the National Army from its revolutionary origins till the present, and the future course for the National Army's development. 51 General Alvarez concluded by saying that the reorganization

⁴⁹Lieuwen, Mexican Militarism, pp. 85-92.

^{50&}quot;Importante Junta para Reorganizar el Ejército," <u>El Universal</u>, May 7, 1925, section one, pp. 1 and 9.

^{51&}quot;La Reorganización del Ejército Nacional," <u>El</u> <u>Universal</u>, May 7, 1925, section one, p. 9.

of the National Army must include both a physical and a moral reform. 52

As a result of this conference, a special commission reexamined the existing laws and regulations that formed the military's legal foundation. Finding them outdated and ineffective, the commission published in 1926 four major military laws. 53 The first, entitled the Law of Discipline, defined the behavior that all service members were expected to follow. According to article one, "military service requires that a soldier shall perform his duties to the utmost, and that he shall place the sovereignty of the Nation, loyalty to the institutions, and honor to the National Army and Navy before all personal interests." The Law of Retirement and Pensions specified the ages of mandatory retirement for all active duty members, credited veterans of the Revolution with additional years of service that could be applied towards retirement, provided graduated pensions for members with twenty to thirty-five years of service, and set up benefits for dependents of deceased service members. The Law of Promotions did away with the old system of automatic promotions and generales de gedo, or those officers whose high rank was bestowed upon them during battle at the point of a finger. 54 Under the new law,

^{52&}quot;La Reorganización del Ejército Nacional," <u>El</u> <u>Universal</u>, May 9, 1925, section one, p. 5

⁵³Diario Oficial, Mexico, March 15, 1926, pp. 1-16.

⁵⁴Lieuwen, <u>Mexican Militarism</u>, p. 87.

promotions could only be made when vacancies existed. Competitive examinations determined who would fill these vacancies, with consideration given only to those officers with professional training and active-duty experience. In times of war, the law specified the necessary conditions that would merit a battlefield promotion. Finally, the Organic Law established the military's basic organization and structure. The law specifically stated that the army's mission would be "to defend the integrity and independence of the nation, to maintain the authority of the constitution, and to preserve internal order," and that the president would be the supreme commander of all military The effect of these new laws on the military was forces. considerable. As a recent analyst of the Mexican military has stated,

In general, these new laws tended to have an institutionalizing effect on the army because they weakened the influence of high level commanders by creating a set of policies and standards that centralized military power in the hands of the Secretary of War, who reported directly to the President of the Republic. . . . By regulating and standardizing the army's mission, promotions, and compensation, military caudillos saw their traditional influence erode and pass to the collective institution of the army. As a result of these laws, the collective institution, and not individual leaders, now dictated the army's norms and standards. 55

Having created a legal framework for regulating the development of the military, Amaro then established a more comprehensive system of military education that would

⁵⁵Stephen J. Wager, "The Mexican Army, 1940-1982: The Country Comes First" (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1992), pp. 115-116.

improve the quality of training for all service members. Due to neglect and incompetence by the directors and instructors of the <u>Colegio Militar</u>, Amaro decided to close down the academy in 1925 for an indefinite time. ⁵⁶ On July 24, 1926, after making significant changes to the curriculum and constructing new facilities, Amaro reopened the school. In his address at the school's reinauguration, Calles stressed the same ideals of service to country and loyalty to the principles of the Revolution that Obregón had made in his speech ten years ago. In part, Calles stated,

. . . unless we see to it that those who graduate from here as experts in the art of war preserve all their characteristics as men, without departing in the slightest degree from the life and the sentiment of the nation; that while they are versed in military tactics and technique and prepared to follow the hazardous career of arms they shall above and before all remain servants of the nation . . .

. . . The <u>Colegio Militar</u> is not . . . an establishment which differs in any way from the other institutions in which the government is trying to educate the new generation of the country. . . . But in all these schools, from the <u>Colegic Militar</u>, to the smallest rural school, . . . we are seeking to turn out men who shall learn, from their childhood, that they have a social mission with which later on in their mature years they must comply—to serve others. That is to say, not to expend their forces entirely for their own . . . betterment, but . . . [to give] their lives to insure the social uplifting of the majority, which . . . is the aim and justification of the revolutionary movement in Mexico. ⁵⁷

⁵⁶"La Enseñanza Militar y La Revolución," <u>Excelsior</u>, October 19, 1925, p. 5.

⁵⁷Robert Hammond Murray, <u>Mexico Before the World</u>, <u>Public Documents and Addresses of Plutarco Elías Calles</u> (New York: The Academy Press, 1927), pp. 160-162.

Because of the lack of advanced military schools in Mexico, Amaro sent his best lieutenants and captains to military academies in France, Spain, Italy, and the United States, and assigned military attachés to Mexico's foreign embassies to learn the latest military techniques. 58 Upon their return, Amaro used these officers to form the Comisión de Estudios Militares, which studied and recommended solutions to various military problems. Apart from the contributions made by the officers who served in this commission, Amaro realized that the Mexican military could not rely on foreign academies and embassies to provide advanced training for its officers.

Perhaps Amaro's most recognized contribution towards the professionalization of the National Army occurred when he left his position as Secretary of War in 1932 and became the Director of Military Education. In this year, Amaro supervised the creation of the Escuela Superior de Guerra. This school was specifically designed to train promising company and field-grade officers (lieutenant through lieutenant colonel) for battalion or higher command and staff duties, and to develop and disseminate tactical and strategic doctrine. 59 The three-year school required all

⁵⁸Lieuwen, <u>Mexican Militarism</u>, pp. 92-93.

⁵⁹ José Mijares Palencia, <u>El gobierno mexicano</u> (Mexico: Sociedad Mexicana de Publicaciones, 1936), pp. 95-96, and Lyle N. McAlister, <u>The Military in Latin American Socio-Political Evolution: Four Case Studies</u> (Washington, D.C.: Center for Research in Social Systems, 1970), p. 206.

applicants to be highly qualified in their particular field, and admitted only those who passed a rigorous entrance examination. The school's first director. General Luis Alamillo Flores, took special care to ensure that the faculty was staffed only by Mexican nationals. 60 While the top political and military leaders recognized the importance of sending officers abroad to study the latest military techniques, they wanted to ensure that the training given to younger officers was nationally controlled. As the official history book of the Mexican military states, the Escuela Superior de Guerra employed only Mexican instructors "in order to avoid foreign influences that could distort the revolutionary ideals with which the institution was founded."61

In addition to the <u>Escuela Superior de Guerra</u>, two other important schools were created during Calles' reign. The first, the <u>Escuela Militar de Enlace y Transmisiones</u>, was created in 1925 to train junior officers (second lieutenant through captain) in the field of communications. 62 The second school, created in 1932, was called the <u>Escuela Militar de Aplicación</u>. This school was designed for senior captains and majors who required training in the areas of

⁶⁰León Toral, <u>El ejército mexicano</u>, p. 478.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶²Robert G. Wesson, <u>The Latin American Military</u> <u>Institution</u> (New York: Praeger, 1986), p. 23.

infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineering beyond that received in the Colegio Militar. 63

As a means of further disseminating technical, cultural, and professional information to military members, Amaro gave the military its own press, and made it responsible for publishing three military journals. In addition to "El Soldado," which had a distribution of 20,000 issues, the press also printed "Revista del Ejército y de la Marina," and "Patria," which boasted a distribution of 10,000 and 6,500 copies respectively. 64 Like the mission of civic action, these military journals provided an excellent means of reinforcing the military's revolutionary heritage, and indoctrinating service members with a sense of commitment to the principles of the Revolution. 65

While Amaro was busy as the Director of Military

Education, his successor as Secretary of War, General Pablo

Quiroga (and for a short period, General Lázaro Cárdenas),

proposed and implemented several changes to the structure of

the War Department that effected nearly every branch. 66

Quiroga and Cárdenas created several new branches; the

⁶³ Virginia Prewett, "The Mexican Army," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 3, (April, 1941), p. 614.

⁶⁴León Toral, <u>El ejército mexicano</u>, pp. 479, and 482.

⁶⁵ Ibid., pp. 452 and 474, and Lieuwen, <u>Mexican</u> Militarism, p. 95.

⁶⁶México, Secretaría de Guerra y Marina, <u>Memoria</u>, (1932-1933), pp. 265-286, and Francisco Javier Gaxiola, <u>El Presidente Rodríquez</u> (Mexico, 1938), pp. 278-285.

Inspección General del Ejército ensured, at least in theory, that military law and regulations were closely observed; the Dirección de Materiales de Guerra centralized under one command all of the military's purchasing, storage, repair, and manufacturing facilities; the Junta de Superior Calificadora de Méritos made sure that promotions were given on the basis of professional qualifications only; and the Servicio de Intendencia implemented sound accounting procedures and better fiscal management. Quiroga and Cárdenas also created the Dirección de Archivo Militar and the Departamento de Ingenieros and, within the Departamento de Artillería, added two new sections for chemical warfare and anti-aircraft defense. Finally, the Dirección de Armada Nacional was given a greater standing within the War Department so that necessary modifications to the navy could be made.

Although Calles and Amaro placed the emphasis of their professionalization program on officers, they also implemented reforms that affected the enlisted ranks. Amaro enforced military standards in dress and appearance, encouraged physical fitness and sports, and ordered the construction of new barracks and the reconditioning of old ones. 67 Amaro also helped reduce illiteracy among the enlisted ranks by building libraries specifically for

⁶⁷León Toral, <u>El ejército mexicano</u>, p. 474, and G.A. Salas, "La Sucesión Presidencial y el Ejército," <u>Excelcior</u>, June 15, 1927.

military-service members. 68 Similar to Obregón's policy, Amaro employed the soldiers in civic action programs. In addition to roadbuilding and other public works, the military was involved in such programs as the Department of Health's vaccination program in Oaxaca. 69 Such programs greatly reinforced the military's sense of service to the nation, and served as a concrete example of how, in their own view, the military was truly dedicated to upholding the ideals of the Revolution.

During the prolonged period in which Calles directed the military's professionalization process, we can see that he began to build on the accomplishments of Carranza and Obregón. Given a more modernized and unified military, Calles, with Amaro's assistance, was now able to advance the professionalization process by creating an institutional framework that included a standard set of military laws and a formal system of military schools. Continuing the pattern set in past administrations, Calles made every effort to ensure that the military's professional development was imbued with a sense of service to the nation and commitment to the ideals of the Revolution. The stage was now set for Cárdenas to build upon these advancements with his own unique program of professionalization.

⁶⁸"Tendrán Bibliotecas Especiales los Militares," <u>El Universal</u>, May 26, 1925, p. 1.

^{69&}quot;Fuerza Armada Para Obligar a la Gente a que se Vacune," <u>El Universal</u>, May 4, 1925, section two, p. 3.

The Cárdenas Years, 1934-1940

As discussed in Chapter 3, Cárdenas sought to create a strong base of political support among labor and peasant groups through such policies as land redistribution and labor unionization. However, Cárdenas' policies were not limited to gaining the support of peasants and laborers, for Cárdenas employed the same strategy in an attempt to earn the political support of junior officers and troops in the military. While past administrations were forced to work with revolutionary generals and senior officers whose military background stemmed directly from the battlefields of the Revolution, Cárdenas implemented a process of military professionalization that catered to a growing number of junior officers and enlisted soldiers who were products of the military's academies and training schools.

Perhaps the best way of earning the allegiance of the younger officers was to implement reforms that would allow these officers to rise in rank, assume greater command positions, and eventually replace the revolutionary generals. To accomplish this, Cárdenas established in 1936 a new promotion system based on a competitive examination that added or subtracted points from the officer's score based on age, health, physical condition, seniority in service, and ability to command. In addition, Cárdenas passed a law that reduced from thirty-five years to twenty-five the maximum time that an officer could serve on active

⁷⁰ León Toral, <u>El ejército mexicano</u>, p. 485.

duty.⁷¹ Obviously, the intent of these policies was to force the older generals into retirement so that room could be made for the younger, postrevolutionary generation of officers. Although there were many generals who, in spite of the new policies, were able to prevent their retirement, Cárdenas was successful in promoting the younger, academytrained officers to command positions.

The placement of these junior officers in command positions where the revolutionary generals had once held supreme authority was an important development. Obviously, Cárdenas was using these officers to create a buffer zone between the troops and the generals who might wish to use their armies against the government. Apparently, the legal reforms instituted by Calles and Amaro had sufficiently weakened the power of the revolutionary generals, allowing Cárdenas to successfully challenge the generals in this manner. The only rebellion that occurred during this period was that of General Saturnino Cedillo in 1938, and because he failed to garner support from any of the other generals, he was quickly and easily defeated. It is also possible that the growing age of the revolutionary generals and the potential benefits from retirement pensions

⁷¹prewett, "The Mexican Army," p. 614.

⁷²José Luis Piñeyro Piñeyro, "The Mexican Army and the State: Historical and Political Perspective," Revue Internationale de Sociologie, Vol. 14 (April-August, 1978), p. 120.

and "functional graft" caused many of the generals to lose their zeal for independence.

Cárdenas also put increased emphasis on improving the promotion opportunities and lifestyle of the enlisted troops. In 1937, he created the Centro de Instrucción de Jefes y Oficiales to prepare selected non-commissioned officers or sergeants for service as officers. enlisted men who wanted to rise in the ranks were now required to prove themselves through formal education and technical training, rather than through personal loyalty to a particular general. 73 Also, in 1934, Cárdenas completed a model army base at Monterrey, known as Ciudad Militar, which served as a prototype in the construction of future military communities. 74 The base was equipped with underground natural-gas heating, purified water, drainage systems, and modern electrical wiring. Military personnel and their families also had use of a hospital, theater, library, and gymnasium, and were able to shop at several on-base stores. Finally, the base also had schools where enlisted men could be trained in the use of modern agricultural techniques and other trades that would enable the soldiers to support themselves once they left the military.

Given the above discussion, one can see that Cárdenas was more concerned about the effect that professionalism

⁷³Prewett, "The Mexican Army," p. 614.

⁷⁴McAlister, The Military in Latin American Socio-Political Evolution, p. 207.

would have on winning the political loyalty of the military, than on correcting any military incompetence or inefficiency caused by poor organization or inferior training and equipment. In a 1935 address to a graduating class of cadets, Cárdenas stated,

We should not think of ourselves as professional soldiers . . . but rather as armed auxiliaries organized from the humble classes. . . [Hence,] it is the duty of young officers to broaden the collective spirit of the nation and help incorporate the humble into the whole program of the Revolution. 75

A critical development during the Cárdenas administration was his ability to equate Mexico's dominant political party with the social, political, and economic goals of the Revolution, and therefore transform the political party into an institutional symbol of this revolutionary ideology. The president, as the official leader of the political party, was also identified with this revolutionary ideology, and therefore gained a great deal of legitimacy. 76 More than any other president since the Revolution, Cárdenas was able to use his radical programs of land redistribution and labor rights to symbolize his commitment to the goals of the Revolution. Cárdenas was thus able to use his unique political position as "spokesman" for the Revolution to instill in the military a sense of loyalty to the government by consistently emphasizing the common revolutionary goals of the military

⁷⁵ Cited in Lieuwen, Mexican Militarism, p. 120.

⁷⁶Scott, Mexican Government in Transition, pp. 134-137.

and the national government. For Cárdenas, the key instrument in fostering this loyalty would be the use of civic action.

With the passage of the Organic Law in 1926, civic action became an officially recognized mission of the military, 77 and under Cárdenas, the mission of civic action as a doctrine and a formal program was emphasized to a greater degree than in previous administrations. 78 In a government publication that provides detailed information on the party's six-year plan and a declaration of its principles and statutes, one can truly see the great emphasis given to the military's mission of civic action. 79 According to the publication, the military was involved in irrigation projects, the construction of roads, public buildings and airports, and the repair of telephone and telegraph lines. The Engineering Corps also helped in the government's land redistribution program, perhaps the ultimate symbol of what the Revolution stood for, by surveying lands for communal farming, planning ejidos (collective land grants), and conducting a census of the peasant population.

⁷⁷Organic Law of the National Army, Title III, Article 81.

⁷⁸McAlister, The Military in Latin American Socio-Political Evolution, p. 209.

⁷⁹Gilberto Bosques, <u>The National Revolutionary Party of Mexico and the Six-Year Plan</u> (Mexico City: Bureau of Foreign Information, 1937), pp. 357-359.

At the same time that Cárdenas was promoting civic action, he also sought to increase loyalty to the government by restructuring the system of military enlistment. 80 The old system of voluntary enlistment from the immediate area often encouraged regional loyalty to the local military commander. Therefore, in 1939, Cárdenas passed the Law of Obligatory Military Service, which created a lottery that drew recruits from a wide range of regional, social, economic, and political backgrounds.

In comparison to previous administrations, Cárdenas made only a few notable changes to the organizational structure of the military. In 1937, Cárdenas reorganized the War Department (Secretaría de Guerra y Marina) to reflect the defensive nature of the military's mission, changing the name of the new department to the Department of National Defense (Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional).81 Also, in 1938, Cárdenas created the Dirección de las Armas, which unified the separate departments associated with artillery, cavalry, and infantry under a single department.82 Another change was made to the Department of National Defense in 1940 when it lost command responsibility for the navy and

⁸⁰ Lieuwen, Mexican Militarism, p. 120.

⁸¹ México, Secretaría de Gobernación, <u>Seis Años de</u> Gobierno al Servicio de México, 1934-1940 (1940), p. 87.

⁸² León Toral, <u>El ejército mexicano</u>, p. 485.

other related departments to the newly created Department of the Navy (Departamento Autónomo de la Marina Nacional).83

established during the <u>maximato</u>, there were still some notable developments related to military education. In 1935, Cárdenas required all infantry officers below the rank of colonel to pass a proficiency examination. Those that failed the test were then required to attend the <u>Escuela de Aplicación</u>. 84 The only other notable occurrence was the creation of the <u>Escuela de Oficiales de Sanidad</u> in 1937, and the <u>Escuela Militar de Enfermeras</u> in 1938. 85 The military created these schools to train male and female nurses for service in the Army and the Air Force. Over the years, they have earned a solid reputation for the high caliber of their graduates.

Aside from the few organizational changes and the creation of additional military schools, professionalization of the military during the Cárdenas years was marked by policies that sought to bring a younger generation of officers into leadership positions. A second distinguishing characteristic was the emphasis Cárdenas placed on improving the welfare of the enlisted ranks. By promoting a younger generation of officers and gaining the confidence of the

⁸³Seis Años de Gobierno al Servicio de México, p. 405.

⁸⁴Prewett, "The Mexican Army," p. 614.

⁸⁵ León Toral, <u>El ejército mexicano</u>, p. 517.

enlisted ranks, Cárdenas sought to gain their loyalty by stressing the common revolutionary goals of both the military and the government.

Conclusion

As shown in the above discussion, the professionalization of the Mexican military was marked by a number of evolutionary phases that were fairly unique in character. Carranza was primarily concerned with modernizing and reorganizing the military so that it could begin to take on the characteristics of a genuine military institution. Building on Carranza's achievements, Obregón incorporated autonomous armies into the newly formed National Army, and successfully eliminated those revolutionary generals who resisted his efforts at creating a unified military. With a more cohesive military, Calles was now able to advance the professionalization process by establishing an institutional framework that formalized the professional development of the Mexican military. This was accomplished primarily through a standard code of military laws and a comprehensive system of military education. Finally, Cárdenas brought the newly-trained officers who were now graduates of the military's training schools and academies into positions of command. Throughout this entire transformation, the military and political leaders made a conscious effort to instill within the military a sense of loyalty and commitment to the principles of the Revolution.

Maving now discussed both the decline of the Mexican military's political influence and its historical process of professionalization, it may be helpful to reexamine the central question posed in the introduction: what role did the professionalization of the Mexican military during the years 1917 to 1940 play in limiting the political influence of the military? To answer this question fully, we must now turn our attention to the next chapter, where the unique characteristics of the Mexican military's professionalization will be identified and examined, and where the case of Mexico will be analyzed with respect to the general theory concerning political influence and military professionalism.

CHAPTER 5

AN ANALYSIS OF PROFESSIONALISM

Introduction

After closely examining the Mexican military's professionalization and the decline of its political influence, we are now in a much better position to analyze the relationship between these two variables. As we shall see, there were many unique characteristics of the Mexican military's professionalization that proved to be a great factor in the decline of its political influence. drawing on much of the theory discussed in Chapter 2 concerning the relationship between military professionalism and political influence, the unique nature of Mexico's professionalism will become readily apparent. While the main purpose of this chapter is to show the critical role of military professionalization, this chapter will also seek to identify other factors that played an important role in the decline of the military's political influence. Before we begin this analysis, however, it is first necessary to examine the degree to which the Mexican military was professionalized.

The Degree of Professionalism

As discussed in the introduction, McKinlay's definition of professionalism encompassed five concepts: expertise,

institutional autonomy, internal controls, social responsibility, and corporateness. From the discussion in Chapter 4, we can see that in terms of expertise, the Mexican military became very professional. Military schools were established to instruct officers and enlisted soldiers in such areas as artillery, cavalry, and engineering. Furthermore, promotions were made on the basis of competitive examinations, and officers who could not meet certain levels of proficiency were required to attend one of the several existing military schools. 1

To measure the second concept of professionalism, institutional autonomy, McKinlay specified the need for a formal system of demarcation that separated the profession from others in terms of occupation and activity. Once again, the Mexican military seems to have met this qualification. Perhaps this was best shown by Amaro's creation in 1926 of the four major military laws that defined the behavior expected of service members and standardized the military's mission, promotions, pay, and retirement. The concept of internal controls is somewhat related to institutional autonomy, and involves the existence of certain behavioral standards that are

In general, these reforms were more applicable at the middle and junior officer level. Higher ranking officers with political ties were often able to avoid these restrictions. See Lyle N. McAlister, The Military in Latin American Socio-Political Evolution: Four Case Studies (Washington, D.C.: Center for Research in Social Systems, 1970), p. 206.

internalized through training or occupational socialization, and the impartial application of rules and regulations. With the creation of the military laws mentioned above, the training provided by the extensive military educational system, and the establishment of a promotion system based on competitive examinations, the Mexican military meets this requirement as well.

The fourth concept of professionalism is social responsibility, meaning that the expertise acquired by the profession is used to achieve socially responsible goals. This concept is most obvious in the Mexican military's mission of civic action. Through public works that are designed to directly benefit the Mexican civilian population, the Mexican military is able to demonstrate that much of its expertise can be used for the greater interests of the community rather than for personal means. example, in 1936 the military surveyed 390,000 hectares for land redistribution, made 10,260,000 square meters of land suitable for aircraft landing, built 1,150 kilometers of roadways, and converted 410,000 square meters of land into athletic fields. The mission of civic action is made even more critical when one realizes that, by 1937, the Mexican military did not believe that external aggression was

²Gilberto Bosques, <u>The National Revolutionary Party of Mexico and the Six-Year Plan</u> (Mexico City: Bureau of Foreign Information, 1937), pp. 357-359.

likely, and thus could not define its social responsibility in terms of national defense. 3

Of the five concepts covered by McKinlay's definition, corporateness may be the one that least applies to the Mexican military. McKinlay stated that corporateness was defined by "the collective recognition of the clear differentiation of that body from other organizations." 4 Yet, it appears that the revolutionary ideology that so characterized the Mexican military was used not to differentiate the military from society, but to encourage the military to identify with the Mexican populace. In a review of the speeches made by such leaders as Calles and Cárdenas, the following phrases can be found:

. . . The <u>Colegio Militar</u> is not . . . an establishment which differs in any way from the other institutions in which the government is trying to educate the new generation of the country . . . 5

We should not think of ourselves as professional soldiers . . . but rather as armed auxiliaries organized from the humble classes . . . 6

³Ibid., p. 353.

⁴R.D. McKinlay, "Professionalization, Politicization, and Civil-Military Relations," in <u>The Perceived role of the Military</u>, ed. M.R. Van Gils (Belgium: Rotterdam University Press), p. 251.

⁵Robert Hammond Murray, <u>Mexico Before the Worla, Public Documents and Addresses of Plutarco Elías Calles</u> (New York: The Academy Press, 1927), pp. 160-162.

⁶Cited in Edwin Lieuwen, <u>Mexican Militarism: The</u>
Political Rise and Fall of the Revolutionary Army, 1910-1940
(Albuquerque: The University of New Mexico Press, 1968), p. 120.

We must reclaim the existence of the military with the daily life of the nation; to the soldier who is isolated in the barracks and living outside society we must reaffirm in him the spirit of a man who continues being a citizen.

Of course, Mexico's leaders went beyond the use of mere phrases to create a sense of unity between the military and the Mexican citizen. Besides providing the military with the mission of civic action, Mexico's leaders also enacted such policies as the Law of Obligatory Military Service, which was designed to recruit into the military soldiers that were more representative of Mexican society. While the Mexican military may be corporate in the sense that they share a sense of unity as a military institution, extra care has been taken to ensure that they identify strongly with Mexican society in general.

Professionalization of the Mexican Military: Unique Aspects

Mexico's "Revolutionary" Professionalism

Undoubtedly the most unique aspect of the Mexican military's professionalization was the ability of Mexico's political and military leaders to consistently and successfully incorporate a revolutionary ideology into this process. Initially, this ideology served to associate the mission of the military with a sense of loyalty to the principles of the Mexican Revolution. In all probability, it may not have been too difficult to establish this

⁷Ibid.

⁸Thid.

association. After all, the armies that emerged victorious from the battles of the Revolution had taken a direct role in a struggle that was commonly believed to be a battle for the social betterment of the average Mexican. With the defeat of Diaz and Huerta, the nation did witness a certain degree of political, social, and economic reform.

Undoubtedly, the military's role in bringing about these reforms gave them a sense of accomplishment, as well as a sense that these hard-won reforms must be maintained.

The leaders who came to power in Mexico in the years 1917-1940 appeared to recognize the importance of promoting the military's identification with this revolutionary heritage. As we saw in the last chapter, such leaders as Obregón and Calles consistently sought to reinforce the concept of the military as defenders of the Revolution through presidential speeches to the military. They also bestowed upon the military the mission of civic action, which involved the military in such public works as roadbuilding, school construction, and medical vaccinations. These duties greatly reinforced the idea that the military was a positive force in furthering the goals of the Revolution. Most important perhaps, these leaders established military academies and created military journals that transmitted this ideology to the succeeding generations of military officers, who steadily made up a greater proportion of the officer corps.

Gradually, the somewhat abstract concept of the military as defenders of the Revolution evolved into a more important and concrete concept, namely, the military as defenders of those government institutions that developed as a result of the Revolution. In this sense, Cárdenas played a critical role, for it was during his administration that the principles of the Revolution became equated with the goals of the national government. Prior to Cárdenas, it was still possible to view the policies of the government and the principles of the Revolution as two distinct entities. However, when Cárdenas formed the Partido de la Revolución Mexicana (PRM), he formally incorporated Mexico's most important social classes into a single dominant political party that came to be recognized as an institutional symbol of the Revolution. He was then able to place himself as the chief spokesman for this party, and consequently, equate the principles of the Revolution with the policies of the national government. Furthermore, the idea that the president was the legitimate leader of the Revolution did not end with Cárdenas, but was transferred to future presidents as well.

One can demonstrate the close association between Mexico's revolutionary ideology and the military, and the consequent effect this had on ensuring military loyalty, by examining a letter written by Cárdenas in 1937. The letter was read on behalf of Cárdenas at a military banquet in

celebration of Soldier's Day in 1937. The letter stated in part that

while the peasant and the worker strive for their betterment in the countryside and in the shops under the loving care of the State, the Mexican soldier keeps faithful watch over the heritage that the Revolution provided for his class brothers.

Our Revolution was made possible by the Army. It is not yet ended. . . . It began as a democratic political movement against the tyranny of Porfirio Díaz that . . . sought effective suffrage and no reelection.

It was in the second period that the Revolution . . . demanded the redistribution of the land in an equitable and just manner, the organization of labor . . . and the nationalization of the national resources. . .

We are now in the third period of the Revolution, . . [in which] the true causes that led to the Revolution are inquired into . . . These causes are Ignorance and Poverty.

These are the tasks the Government today is attacking with firmness and cheerfulness, and with equal cheerfulness and firmness the Army is committed to support the policies that are transforming Mexico.

All soldiers should be well aware that when new sources of production are tapped, that when wages are improved, that when lands are redistributed, that when credit facilities are given to communal land holders, opportunities are being created for them through which they shall all the easier find remunerative work once they have left the Army and returned to civilian life. They shall then be able to come into the more easeful life which the Government is striving to provide for all workers.

As to the officers, those who like myself have embraced soldiering as a profession, what greater satisfaction can there be for us than to cooperate with faith and patriotism in the task of the revolutionary Governments of Mexico that are making our country prosperous and earning for it full respect? . . .

Time was when the Army devoted itself solely to its professional tasks. Now however, without neglecting what is peculiarly its own sphere, it is more and more welcome to cooperate in the construction of a newer Mexico. . . .

That the Army shares [with the government] these [revolutionary] ideals cannot be doubted. The Commander in Chief . . . wishes to express his firm belief that the Army will not deviate from the course that it has laid out for itself but will continue to deserve the esteem and the respect felt for it by the popular classes of the country. From these classes the Army has sprung and with these classes it shall continue to cooperate in the task of a thorough national reconstruction.

The quotation captures the essential nature of how the political and military leaders of Mexico consistently sought to incorporate a revolutionary ideology into the military professionalization process and thereby enhance the loyalty of the military. The first paragraph is representative of the kind of statement that had now become a standard in virtually all presidential speeches made to the military. In this kind of statement, the military is always depicted as a guardian of the Revolution on behalf of all Mexican citizens. The following paragraphs reinforce such concepts as the continuous nature of the Revolution, the role of the military in ensuring that this revolutionary process will continue, and the stake that the military has in supporting the Revolution. Thus, the military is not only a quardian of the Revolution, but also an active participant in the achievement of its goals. The last paragraph is critical because it reinforces the idea that the national government and the military share the same revolutionary goals, with the implication that loyalty to the principles of the

⁹Bosques, <u>The National Revolutionary Party of Mexico</u> and the Six-Year Plan, pp. 359-367.

Revolution is equivalent with loyalty to the national government.

Given that the professionalization of the Mexican military was strongly influenced by a unique revolutionary ideology, it is interesting to examine how this phenomenon relates to the theory on professionalization and political influence discussed in Chapter 2. In one sense, this unique characteristic of the Mexican military undermines the idea that the military will have difficulty identifying with the government in power. For example, Finer believed that the military's awareness of themselves as professionals would cause them to believe that they were servants of the state, rather than the particular government in power. Yet, in Mexico, the concept of the state has been equated with the particular government in power, since both the state and the government have been defined as revolutionary by the PRM (and its antecedents), which have controlled both since 1920. Further, since the Mexican military's concept of professionalism includes adherence to a revolutionary ideology (as defined by the PRM), the goals of the military and the PRM government are complimentary, not divergent.

Finer also believed that professionalism would lead to military intervention in government politics because the government might use the military in an "unprofessional" manner. In other words, rather than use the military to defend the nation against foreign aggression, the state may utilize the military to mute internal dissent from the

government's domestic opponents. This point is also similar to Stepan's theory of "new professionalism," in which the mission of the military focuses on internal security rather than outside aggression. In this case, the concern with internal security leads the military to involve itself with all aspects of the nation's political, economic, and social policies.

Once again, however, the large role that Mexico's revolutionary ideology has played in the professionalization of its military has worked to the advantage of civilian rule in Mexico. In reference to Finer's point, rather than use the military to coerce domestic opponents, Mexico's political leadership was extremely careful to use the military strictly in a manner that would reinforce the military's identification with the Mexican populace, and, by extension, reinforce its perception of itself as a positive force in advancing the goals of the Revolution. reference to Stepan, it is true that in the postrevolutionary period, the Mexican military has been able to develop with little fear of external aggression. Stepan believed that the absence of a realistic external threat in the 1950s and 1960s lead the Peruvian and Brazilian military to adopt the mission of "new professionalism," the Mexican military believed it had adopted a valuable role in furthering the Revolution through the mission of civic action. At the same time, the military was satisfied that the revolutionary nature of the national

government would ensure the proper implementation of political, economic, and social policies. Thus, contrary to what one might expect after examining the theories of Finer and Stepan, the unique revolutionary nature of Mexico's military professionalism was a strong factor in leading to the decline of the military's political influence.

National Control of Professionalism

While the professionalization of the Mexican military may have been most noted for its close association with the Revolution, there were other important characteristics of the professionalization process that separate Mexico from other countries of Latin America. To begin with, the entire professionalization process was controlled by Mexico's political leaders so that the military's continued development would progress in accordance with the best interests of the PRM government. One example of this, as we saw in the last chapter, was that foreign officers were not allowed to teach at the military academies. This is not to imply that Mexico's leaders did not appreciate the knowledge to be gained from the militaries of foreign countries, for Mexico did assign military attachés to foreign embassies in order to learn the latest military techniques. point, however, is that the information obtained from the foreign militaries would only be passed on to the Mexican military through institutions associated with the PRM government. No information would ever be passed to the

Mexican military directly from members of the foreign military itself.

As discussed in Chapter 2, Mexico's almost extreme fear of allowing foreign nations to have direct contact with its military stands in stark contrast to Nunn's portrayal of the professionalization process that occurred in several nations of South America. In Nunn's depiction, the professionalization of the militaries in such nations as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru was carried out directly under the supervision of German and French military To cite only two examples, by the year 1900, the missions. German Colonel Emil Körner presided over the reorganization of the Chilean officer corps, the rewriting of salary and promotion regulations, and the restructuring of educational programs. 10 In Argentina, German officers were in charge of the Escuela Superior de Guerra and trained all Argentine officers until 1914. 11 Furthermore, the foreign influence of the European missions extended beyond the four South American nations already mentioned, since Chilean military missions were sent out to instruct the militaries of Ecuador, Colombia, and El Salvador. 12 According to Nunn,

¹⁰Frederick M. Nunn, <u>Yesterday's Soldiers</u>, (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), p. 108.

¹¹Frederick M. Nunn, "An Overview of the Function Military Missions in Latin America," in The Politics of Antipolitics: The Military in Latin America, eds. Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies Jr. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1978), p. 42.

¹² Nunn, Yesterday's Soldiers, p. 11.

the increased political influence of the South American militaries during the years 1890-1940 can be traced, at least in part, to their professionalization by European military missions. Given this, one can better recognize that the strict control Mexico maintained over its own military professionalization program was in part responsible for the decline of the Mexican military's political influence.

Professionalism for Junior Officers

Another unique aspect of the Mexican military's professionalization process was the conscious decision by Mexico's political and military leaders to focus the primary emphasis of their program on junior officers who had little or no experience in the battles of the Revolution. strategy appears to have had its start under Obregón. seen in the last chapter, after Carranza, Obregón was the president who had to deal with the greatest number of revolutionary generals. These generals had fought directly against the forces of Díaz, Huerta, and other armies during the most violent phase of the Revolution, the years 1910-They believed that the Revolution had triumphed only because of the sacrifices they had made on the battlefield. Furthermore, they had spent much of their time battling the so-called professional Federal Army of Díaz, an institution that represented the opposite of what the Revolution theoretically stood for. Therefore, it is hardly

inconceivable to believe that the majority of these generals would fight any policies that put a limit on their hard-won political influence.

Obregón seemed to recognize the futility of trying to professionalize the revolutionary generals, as seen by many of his policies. As described in chapter 4, Obregón dealt with these generals through the age-old method of pan o palo (carrot or the stick). Thus, Obregón attempted to bribe the generals into submission, or eliminate them through execution or exile. For Obregón, the rebellions that occurred during his presidency, especially the one that occurred in 1923, were very useful in the sense that he was able to identify and eliminate through battle and purges those officers who did not want to accept the military's professionalization programs.

When Calles became president, both he and Amaro took
Obregón's strategy to its next logical step. With many of
the revolutionary generals, but by no means all, either dead
or exiled, their strategy was to gradually professionalize
the Mexican military by starting at the bottom, that is,
they would create a corps of young professional officers who
would eventually inherit control of the military from these
generals. For this reason, Amaro created several new
professional military schools and improved the existing
ones. As part of this effort, an important development was
the creation of a second tier of military schools, best
represented by the Escuela Superior de Guerra, which ensured

that professional military education would not end at the junior officer level, but would continue throughout the officer's career. Of course, Calles and Amaro also felt compelled to use force as well as "functional graft" towards those revolutionary generals who refused to adhere to the new standards of military professionalism.

Once again, the strategy to emphasize military professionalism for the junior officers while using force or bribery to control the senior officers was quite different from the professionalization of other militaries in Latin America. Both Nunn and Stepan describe the professionalization of South American countries as a process that was applied to the entire military. Perhaps even more significant, as shown in Chapter 2, Loveman and Davies did not believe that the professionalization of the military in South America severed the link between the modern military and a caudillo heritage that stressed a firm dislike for civilian politics. Yet, in two significant ways, this link was broken in Mexico. First, the Mexican Revolution virtually eliminated the Federal Army and the long tradition of militarism that was associated with this institution. Second, the new form of militarism as practiced by the revolutionary generals was gradually eliminated through the implementation of a professionalization program that separated these generals from the new generation of professionally trained officers. While the harsh life of the battlefield and the use of military force to gain

political power formed the military experience of the revolutionary generals, the junior officers were much more influenced by the discipline and training associated with the military academies and the new importance placed on technical knowledge and competency. In short, Mexico's unique strategy of focusing its professionalization program on junior officers was an important factor in the decline of the Mexican military's political influence.

Military Professionalization and Civilian Organization

A final unique characteristic of the Mexican military's professionalization appears to be the timing with which it was carried out in relation to the development of civilian political institutions. While the importance of political institutions will be discussed in the next section, the crucial point here is that immediately following the Mexican Revolution, both the revolutionary armed forces and civilian groups were unorganized and in a general state of disarray. Thus, not only did the revolutionary armed forces undergo a process of professionalization, but civilian groups, particularly in the form of labor and peasant groups, experienced at roughly the same time their own "professionalization" through the development of the PNR (Partido Nacional Revolucionario) and the PRM.

The organization of civilian forces into a strong political party concurrent with the professionalization of

the military was not a common occurrence in other Latin American countries. As one scholar has stated,

By the 1920's, therefore, the military institution in most South American countries was by far the best organized force within each society. Officer's education levels were, in general, superior to that of their civilian class counterparts. Officers, because they were aware of this fact . . . developed an increasing sense of being isolated from and largely superior to civil society. 13

Thus, not only was it important that civilian forces were organized into a strong political party, but it was crucial that they were organized prior to or concurrent with the professionalization of the military. Without an organized civilian institution, such as the strong political party that developed in Mexico, no civilian political counterforce to the military would exist. Nunn also recognized the crucial importance of this concept in his assertion that

where a gap existed between civilian and military institutional development, . . . [as] in Chile, where the development of the military profession was at a relatively advanced state by the end of the century, the effectiveness of the political system proved illusory . . [T]his provoked ruptures in the traditional military-civilian relationship: subservience to civilian direction and control. 14

Thus, in Mexico, the fact that military professionalization was implemented at a rate consistent with political institutionalization has been another important factor

¹³George Philip, "Military Rule in South America: The Dilemmas of Authoritarianism," in <u>The Political Dilemmas of Military Regimes</u>, eds. Christopher Clapham and George Philip (New Jersey: Barnes and Noble Books, 1985), p. 130.

¹⁴ Nunn, Yesterday's Soldiers, p. 15.

leading to the decline of the military's political influence.

Other Contributing Factors

Creation of a Political Party

While we have seen how the Mexican military's unique process of professionalization contributed to the decline of the military's political influence, there were other factors that were also important in bringing about this phenomenon. Of these factors, probably the most significant was the creation of a strong political party. As seen in the discussion in Chapter 3 concerning the process of presidential succession, Obregón initiated the creation of a political party system by widening his base of political support beyond the military. Specifically, Obregón began to organize the labor and agrarian sectors into political parties, and created a strong labor union, the CROM, that was able to exert a great deal of influence within the political system. While the political parties were still relatively weak in comparison to the military, Obregón began to create an alternative to a strict dependence on the military for political support.

Like Obregón, Calles continued to organize labor and agrarian groups to increase political support for his policies. However, through the creation of the PNR, Calles also took the important step of institutionalizing the process of presidential succession. Rather than allow the

presidency to be decided by the military force of the revolutionary generals, as in the past, the PNR would theoretically allow not only the military, but also agrarian and labor groups to peacefully influence the selection of the next president. With the creation of the PNR and its formal recognition by labor and agrarian groups, both the revolutionary generals and the National Army as a military institution would find it increasingly impractical to rely on force as a means for influencing the process of presidential succession.

When Cárdenas reorganized the PNR into the PRM, he put into practice much of what the PNR was meant to accomplish. By reorganizing the party on a functional basis, giving equal representation to the newly created agrarian, labor, military, and popular sectors, Cárdenas was able to bring the political activities of the military into the open. He was then able to use the combined political strength of the labor, agrarian, and popular sectors to offset the political power of the military. In short, the organization of the labor and agrarian groups and their incorporation into a institutionalized political party made it much more difficult for the military to influence the political process, and especially to determine who would occupy the office of the presidency.

Agrarian and Labor Militias

In addition to the creation of a strong political party supported by highly mobilized labor and agrarian groups, it is also important to recognize that these same groups were organized into armed militias. While the institutionalization of the political process was an important factor in limiting the military's political influence, it may have been much more difficult for this to occur without the existence of an armed force that the government could rely on to act as a physical counterforce to the military. Given the organization of the labor and agrarian groups, perhaps it was only natural that they would be used to form militias to serve as this physical counterforce.

As we saw in Chapter 3, the labor and agrarian militias played an important part in helping to put down several military rebellions that occurred after 1920. In every major revolt, the militias remained loyal to the government, and, particularly during the 1923 rebellion, were a key element in the government's victory over the rebels. In addition, well after the last major rebellion in 1929, Cárdenas continued to build up the militias even as he scaled down the military forces. In 1935, Cárdenas announced plans to infuse the military reserves with some 1,500,000 peasants. 15 Even though these agrarian reserves

 $^{^{15}}$ R.L. Martin, "Mexico to Create Big Reserve Army," New York Times, July 18, 1935, p. 7.

would technically fall under the jurisdiction of the National Army, it was obvious that in any given conflict with the military, Cárdenas' popularity with the peasants would ensure the loyalty of these reserves to the national government. Perhaps even more important was Cárdenas' expansion of the labor militia. At a time when the military was becoming increasingly wary of the president's land and labor reforms, Cárdenas had a labor militia of 100,000 men parade through the streets of the capital as a show of force. According to the New York Times correspondent,

The New World's first proletarian army marched here today [Mexico City] in military units and uniforms--about 100,000 strong--as Mexico celebrated May Day.

President Lázaro Cárdenas showed any would-be enemies that . . . he had fashioned a well-drilled worker's army far outstripping in size the Mexican Regular Army of 55,000, scattered throughout the country. Earlier in the week President Cárdenas had said in a speech that if those entrusted with arms to protect the national institutions revolted, the people would fight to protect the proletarian regime. 16

Thus, as the Mexican military had seen during the various rebellions, any attempt to use force to coerce or overthrow the national government would be met by the military might of the labor and agrarian militias, militias over which they had little control.

¹⁶Frank L. Kluckhohn, "Cárdenas Reviews Worker's Army of 100,000; Mexican Proletarians Get Uniforms and Arms," New York Times, May 2, 1938, p. 2.

Economic Growth

A final reason for the decline in the Mexican military's political influence may be related to Mexico's economic growth during the years 1920-1940. Because of the Mexican Revolution, it is not surprising that years 1910-1920 were disastrous for Mexico's economy. For example, it is estimated that by the year 1918, the production of corn had declined by 32 percent 17, while manufacturing output had fallen by 23 percent in 1920. 18 However, with the most violent phase of the Revolution at an end, and with greater stability in Mexico's government, the years 1920-1930 witnessed the first signs of economic resurgence. As the economies of the United States and Europe expanded, the demand for Mexico's mineral exports, such as silver, lead, zinc, and copper, also grew. 19 In addition, the reestablishment of a secure railway system and an influx of cheap labor into the big cities gave a large boost to the manufacturing industries.²⁰ In sum, the Mexican economy during the years 1921-1940 saw a sharp drop in oil production, a modest increase in the areas of agriculture

¹⁷ Joaquín Lcredo Goytortúa, "Producción y productividad agrícolas," in <u>México</u>, 50 años de revolución: <u>La economía</u> (México, D.F.: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1960), p. 122.

¹⁸Gonzalo Robles, "El desarrollo industrial," in México, 50 años de revolución: La economía, p. 197.

¹⁹Raymond Vernon, <u>The Dilemma of Mexico's Development</u> (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 79-80.

²⁰Ibid., pp. 80-81.

and livestock, and a dramatic growth in mining, transportation, and manufacturing.²¹ Overall, this led to a 42 percent growth in Mexico's gross domestic product.²²

The growth of the Mexican economy meant that the government's budget would also be able to expand; by 1940, Mexico's budget had grown by over 700 percent from its original amount in 1918.²³ With such a dramatic increase in government expenditures, the Mexican government could afford to increase the actual amount of money spent on the military while drastically reducing the military's percentage of the budget. 24 At the same time the government was able to meet the demands of urban and rural groups by introducing programs intended to assist industrial and agricultural activity. It would seem logical that the growing economic power of the agrarian and labor groups acted as a stimulus for the growing political power of these groups. As we have seen, the growth in the political influence of the labor and agrarian groups and their subsequent incorporation into an institutionalized political system was a strong factor in the decline of the military's political influence. In sum,

²¹Enrique Pérez López, "El producto nacional," in México, 50 años de revolución: La economía, pp. 578, and 588-589.

²²Ibid., pp. 588-589.

²³James W. Wilkie, <u>The Mexican Revolution: Federal Expenditure and Social Change Since 1910</u> (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), pp. 22.

²⁴See Table 8 in Chapter 3.

Mexico's strong and growing economy made it possible for the national government to implement programs that benefited the labor and agrarian classes both economically and politically, and still retain sufficient funds to appease the military. In this sense, the strength of the Mexican economy was another important factor that contributed to the decline of the military's political influence.

Conclusion

While many scholars have argued that military professionalization will lead to an increase in the military's political influence, it should be clear from the above discussion that the professionalization of the Mexican military was a crucial factor in decreasing the military's political influence. However, our examination of the Mexican military has also shown that there were several unique characteristics to this professionalization process that other scholars have not found in their examination of the professionalization of other Latin American militaries. Key among these unique factors has been the incorporation of a revolutionary ideology into the professionalization process that successfully equated loyalty to the principles of the Revolution with loyalty to the national government. Also important was the strong national control that Mexico's leaders maintained over the professionalization process, the emphasis on the professionalization of junior officers, and the development of a strong political party concurrent with

the professionalization of the military. Moreover, the unique nature of Mexico's military professionalism, while critical, cannot claim sole responsibility for the decline in the military's political influence. As we have seen, the creation of a strong political party, the use of labor and agrarian militias, and the growth of the Mexican economy were also important.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

As this thesis has shown, the professionalization of the Mexican military during the years 1917-1940 was greatly responsible for the decline of the military's political influence. Clearly, by 1940 military force could no longer maintain its previous role as the final arbiter of presidential successions. Nor could military men exercise their political influence by continuing to dominate presidential cabinet positions or other political offices. In addition, the military found it increasingly difficult to claim a majority of the national budget, justify the maintenance of a large military force, and prevent the subdivision of its military zones and the rotation of its zone commanders, a key source of the military's autonomy and political influence.

What was it about Mexico's military professionalism that led to these drastic chang in the military's once-powerful political influence? On the surface, the professionalization of the Mexican military does not seem very different from the general description of professionalism provided by Abrahamsson and discussed briefly in Chapter 2. As one may recall, Abrahamsson defined professionalism on two distinct levels:

professionalism₁ and professionalism₂. Professionalism₁ referred to the historical transformation of the military from a group of part-time, forcibly recruited soldiers, to a well-educated, technically and managerially trained corps of experts, recruited on the basis of achievement and skill. According to Abrahamsson, professionalism₂ could also be called professional socialization, and he described it as the indoctrination and internalization of certain values, outlooks, and behavior elements on an individual level.

In the case of Mexico, both elements of professionalism₁ and professionalismo were quite visible. As we saw in Chapter 4, Carranza sought to modernize and reorganize the military in order to create a genuine military institution, while Obregón concentrated on creating a unified National Army that eventually eliminated those revolutionary generals who attempted to remain completely independent of the national government. Building on this foundation, Calles institutionalized military professionalism by creating a standard code of military laws and a comprehensive system of military education, while Cárdenas was able to use early retirements and competitive examinations to bring the newlytrained officers, now graduates of the military's training schools and academies, into positions of command. Professionalism₂ is particularly evident throughout the professionalization process by the extensive use of a revolutionary ideology that sought to instill within the

military a sense of loyalty and commitment to the national government.

While this description of the Mexican military seems to follow Abrahamsson's general portrayal of military professionalization, this thesis has shown that there were several unique aspects of the Mexican military's professionalization that accounted for the decline of its political influence. Thus, the Mexican military's "professional socialization," as Abrahamsson described it, was not based on just any system of values and beliefs, but on a revolutionary ideology that was a key factor in equating loyalty to the principles of the Revolution with loyalty to the national government. In addition, Mexico's leaders sought to preserve this revolutionary ideology by maintaining strict national control over the professionalization process. Also unique was the emphasis with which professionalization was applied to junior officers, while the older veterans of the Revolution were dealt with through either bribery or execution. Finally, it was crucial that the professionalization of the military did not occur by itself, but concurrent with the development of a strong political party.

As we have seen, many scholars have argued that greater military professionalism will cause the political influence of the military to decline, and will therefore lead to a more harmonious and stable relationship among the military and civilian elements of a nation. Other scholars have

taken the opposite view, arguing that greater military professionalism can only lead to an increase in the military's political influence, and therefore a deterioration in civil-military relations. What this thesis has shown is that while the professionalization of the Mexican military did lead to a loss of political influence, there were many unique and critical aspects of this process that were quite different from the kind of professionalization witnessed among other Latin American militaries. Undoubtedly, the political context of the Revolution was the most important variable at play in determining the role of professionalism in Mexico. As new scholars call once again for increased military professionalism in Latin America, they would do well to keep in mind the case of Mexico, and the unique aspects discussed here that have characterized the professionalization of the Mexican military.

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I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.

Jeffrey D. Needell, Chairman Associate Professor of Latin American Studies

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.

Murdo J: MacLeod

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History

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.

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Professor of Geography

This thesis was submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Center for Latin American Studies, to the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, and to the Graduate School and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

December 1992

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